

EIGHTEENTH WAR NUMBER

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THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE POLITICS
OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Contents of Number 134

COMMON COUNCIL
COALITION
GERMANY FROM WITHIN
WAR CRIMES
FORTY YEARS ON
STRATEGY OF THE WAR. XVIII
ELECTION YEAR IN AMERICA

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THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE POLITICS
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COMMON COUNSEL

THE early months of the war were notable for the publication of numerous books and pamphlets discussing the structure of the post-war world, and especially the consequences for the British Commonwealth of the functions it might have to undertake in maintaining a world system aimed at perpetual peace. After the fall of France, when the mere survival of the free nations was brought into question, this speculative debate died down; but now that the prospect of victory, with its vast attendant responsibilities, has begun to open up before us, the discussion has been resumed.

In the new phase of practical urgency, however, it is now led, not by the theorists and men of letters, but by the responsible statesmen of the Commonwealth. At the end of November General Smuts, addressing the Empire Parliamentary Association in London, developed some ideas, which he himself described as "explosive", about the entry of the United Kingdom into Europe as leader of a closer union of the western democracies, and the association of the Dominions with the regional control of the Colonial Empire. In January Mr. Curtin, who had previously put forward proposals for the greater centralization of imperial policy, met Mr. Fraser in conference at Canberra and reached an agreement on a joint foreign and defence policy for the two Pacific Dominions, to include a movement for common action with both Great Britain and the other colonial Powers holding the island belt to the north. The implications of the Canberra Conference for imperial unity were expounded by Mr. Bruce at Guildhall. Lord Halifax, speaking in Toronto, expressed the view that the British peoples cannot discharge their peace-preserving duties in a world dominated by such vast concentrations of power as exist to-day, unless they find means to act during peace in as close concert as they do in war. He has been answered by Mr. Mackenzie King, who holds that the supreme aim is less the organic unity of the Commonwealth than the concert of the world, developing out of the United Nations, and who fears that by drawing closer among themselves the British nations would be drawing apart from their associates and ultimately creating new rivalries in the arena of power politics, leading towards war. The House of Lords has held an important debate, the main upshot of which was to show how extensive is the equipment for consultation at the highest levels which the Commonwealth already possesses.

The task of reconciling these various views of the imperial future is perhaps the most momentous of all those which await the Prime Ministers of the Empire, whose meeting, after many disappointments, is expected to be held in London before long. It is clear that the differences of opinion with which they will be confronted go deep, although there is some ground for believing that the disagreement would be less pronounced if the experience of the Commonwealth in war had been more uniform. At any

rate those members whose own territory has been in imminent danger of invasion—that is, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand—have been most aware of the defects of a system in which there is no joint preparation for war, and have been most receptive of ideas of imperial reconstruction that would bring defence, and consequently foreign policy, which is inseparable from it, into common counsel. The two Dominions whose fighting has been done furthest from their own borders are the least ready to contemplate any tightening of the imperial bond; and the Canadian Government seems to be almost committed against it.

Certain limits, fortunately, can be set to the range of the controversy. Except in Eire there is no dissent anywhere from the tradition that the quarrels of one member of the Commonwealth are the quarrels of all; and it may be taken as certain that, in any future that can be foreseen, should one partner be compelled to fight for the defence of its soil or its principles, the others, though free to choose their course, will in fact choose to stand by its side. The outbreak of war will always, as hitherto, close the imperial ranks. In time of peace, on the other hand, it is equally common ground that the members of the Commonwealth, each and all, desire to become participants with other nations in any system of international order that holds promise of preventing the recurrence of war. If there is any conflict between these two principles, as Mr. Mackenzie King would seem to suggest, then it must by some means be resolved; for both are cardinal.

The Prime Ministers' Conference is therefore bound to consider how to preserve in undiminished effectiveness the established practice of imperial solidarity in case of war, by means that will not tend to isolate the Empire from its friends, whether in war or in peace. The virtues and defects of the system as it exists at present can be succinctly defined by two references to the immediate past. In 1940 the cohesion of the Commonwealth undoubtedly meant the difference between victory and defeat. In 1939, however, it did not mean the difference between peace and war.

If in the future the Commonwealth is to be effective as an organization, not merely for ensuring its members' survival in case of war, but for preventing the calamity of war itself; if it is to perform, alone or in concert with other Powers, the part once played by the British Navy in preserving the peace of the world, then there can be no dissent from Lord Halifax's argument that "we should try to fortify our partnership". It may be fortified either by greater internal unity or by closer external friendships, or by both. But if the war has shown, as General Smuts declares, that "we cannot get away from the problem of power"; if therefore the fighting potential of the whole Empire must for a long time to come be the basis of its influence in the world, then it follows that the unity of warlike action which has never yet failed ought to be reinforced by a unity of preparation against war which did not exist in 1939, and the lack of which clearly lay behind such disasters as the fall of Singapore. This would entail a concerted system for the organization of defence in which the self-governing Dominions would share with the mother country the financial and other burdens and would claim a corresponding proportion of responsibility for the common

foreign policy without which common defence has no meaning. That the Pacific Dominions at least would be ready to bear their share of the burden and of the responsibility was the theme of Mr. Bruce's speech; nor, it would seem, would Canada dissent from the view that joint preparation is a necessary corollary of joint action. But account has to be taken of the powerful body of opinion which now holds, not indeed that combined action by the Commonwealth in time of peace is not a highly desirable ideal in itself, but that it ought to be realized through the unity of the wider society of nations with which all the sovereign members are now so intricately linked.

The answer to the advocates of this doctrine is that there are certain aspects of policy which are inseparably linked with defence, and that in these is the natural domain of imperial collaboration within the wider unity. The history of the League of Nations has shown that preparation for war is the department of policy in which a wide society of independent States is least likely to be efficient. If the nations of the British Commonwealth, with their specially intimate ties, cannot achieve within the ranks of the United Nations an effective organization for defence among themselves, then they would be rash to rely for their safety upon the effectiveness of such an organization in the more heterogeneous body.

Any steps towards a closer integration of imperial policy which the Prime Ministers' Conference may propose are bound to be cautious. Anything in the nature of a permanent imperial executive is manifestly far out of reach. It could not exist without an imperial legislature to control it—that is, without the essential apparatus of federalism. The federal solution of the problem has been before the Empire for a generation, has been ably argued, and has been canvassed afresh during the war. The fact has to be faced that it has gained no adherents among the representative leaders of the Commonwealth. In years to come a generation may arise who are so far removed from the memory of dependent status that they can contemplate the subordination of the parts of the Empire to the whole without any suspicion that it may carry with it the subordination of the junior partners to the senior. Until then it has to be recognized that the concept of national sovereignty is fundamental to the thought of all Dominion leaders (it was, for instance, as prominent in Mr. Bruce's speech as in Mr. Mackenzie King's), and that no political machinery that transgresses it has a chance of acceptance. In particular, the Commonwealth cannot be drawn together by bonds that require the relaxation of the peculiar ties that all its members have contracted with their neighbours, such as those between Canada and the United States.

Yet the integration of the Commonwealth may be connected less with the relaxation of old bonds than with the contracting of new. General Smuts drew a picture of the new world order as dominated by Colossi of power, of which the chief will be the United States and the Soviet Union. Three great Powers of Europe will have perished, and the lesser States will be derelict among the ruins. In these circumstances the small democracies of Europe will be under an overmastering impulse to turn for leadership to the one remaining free nation in their vicinity. The prestige of

Great Britain as the only nation on the Allied side that saw the struggle through from start to finish, as the invincible island that stood alone and survived, and as the impregnable sanctuary of liberal ideas, will be higher than ever before. Under British leadership Europe might attain a unity that would rank it with the great power-concentrations of the post-war world. But at the same time Great Britain, having thrown all she possessed into the conflict, will emerge poor in substance. She cannot on the basis of her own resources attempt to lead a continent. She can only do so in peace, as she fought the war, in close association with the Commonwealth; in truth, it is mainly as the bridge to the partly developed lands across the oceans, the key to the world economy of the future, that she has the greatest appeal to the European mind.

A western Europe newly co-ordinated under the leadership of Great Britain, sustained by the support of the Commonwealth, would be a concentration of power capable of living on equal terms with such giants as the United States and the Soviet Union and of sharing with them the supervision of international destinies. Isolated from Europe, and unsustained by a concerted imperial policy, Great Britain is bound to find herself over-matched by her post-war responsibilities. It is to the advantage of the Dominions that Great Britain should step into Europe and assume its leadership; for in Europe originate most of the dissensions by which, as experience shows, their own peace is threatened, and the economic fortunes of all of them become constantly more closely linked to European markets. They have to appreciate, however, that without their steady collaboration this pacific British leadership of the Continent is out of reach.

Such collaboration cannot, as has been said, in the present state of sentiment throughout the Empire transgress the limits of sovereignty as defined by the Statute of Westminster. All that can be attempted at the present phase is to develop the habit and improve the machinery of consultation between the Governments of the Commonwealth. Much may come about indirectly through the processes of functional co-operation, of which an example involving an outside Power exists in the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, and in which an important experiment has been projected by the Canberra Conference. This regional system of joint action, for social policy and defence, with other Powers in the administration of colonies, a British Dominion taking the lead, has also been proposed by General Smuts for Africa, and may be the means of developing inter-imperial organs of consultation, though not of government, on a large scale.

Beyond regional co-operation, however, which is always likely to be limited in function as well as in geographical scope, lies the question of a consultative body for the whole Commonwealth and Empire. The proposals originally made under this head by Mr. Curtin tended to crystallize, in the House of Lords debate, into a project for extending the sphere of the Imperial Conference, both by holding regular sessions, perhaps in rotation among the Commonwealth capitals, and by endowing it with a permanent secretariat to maintain contacts between the sessions. Lord Cranborne, however, made it clear that there exists, in the present organization of

imperial affairs, no lack of channels into which the currents of common action can easily flow, if once they are stimulated by public opinion. What is deficient at present is the will to use the means to collaboration that are ready in the High Commissioners' offices and elsewhere. There is some reason to think, for instance, that the Dominion representatives to the War Cabinet have yet to be drawn into that full participation in all its activities which rightly belongs to their authority. The process of consultation is not begun at a sufficiently early stage.

The immediate need seems to be to establish such completeness of intercourse at the civil service level of policy between the United Kingdom departments and those of the Dominion representatives that the staff of the latter are aware of all that is passing, and can themselves advise their chief—who, of course, would never be refused any Cabinet document if he knew of its existence—of what is or is not deserving of his personal attention. If this principle is extended, it may afford the key to synthesis of the two main schools of Commonwealth thought. The aim should be to ensure that the whole body of material on which policy is formed is common to the whole Empire. This might require such close contacts between the civil services, possibly such periodic interchanges of members, that in effect a kind of imperial general staff would grow up at the formative level of policy. If that were achieved, and the edifice crowned by some organ of consultation between the Governments, we should have the closest integration that can be attained without interference with sovereign authority. The subject-matter on which decisions were taken would be made identical throughout the Empire; and the best chance would have been procured that five sovereign bodies, translating that subject-matter into policy, would achieve harmony among themselves.

At bottom the question is one of priority in consultation. All agree that the United Nations should follow a common policy in world affairs; all agree that the members of the British Commonwealth should participate in that policy, and therefore should be at unity among themselves. The question at issue is whether the concert of the British nations is to be attempted before or after entering into council with their associates. If the lines of development just suggested be adopted, the partners in the Commonwealth will appear at the board of the United Nations still speaking with five voices, but having ascertained beforehand how near they can come to speaking in unison. In so far as they can establish a habit of co-operation on these lines they will command the authority of a world Power comparable to the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. If their voices are found habitually to contradict one another, each of them, including the United Kingdom, must be content to sink to the level of the second- or third-rank Powers. In that case they may drift into the position of satellites to different more powerful neighbours and the distinctive British contribution to the civilization of the world may be dissipated and eventually lost.

COALITION

HOW LONG WILL IT SURVIVE?

COALITION government in British history has usually derived from one of two sources—either from a deliberate suspension of party in the face of a national crisis, or as part of an evolutionary process during which no satisfactory government can be framed out of one party alone. It may form an epoch to itself, or merely a bridge from one phase of party to another, while its origins depend on a hundred contingencies. And the same with its meaning. It may represent something like dictatorship, yet it can mean that leadership is so weak that government must be put into commission. In any case neither its history nor its potentiality can be thought irrelevant to the present hour.

I. COALITIONS OF THE PAST

WE cannot, for good reason, ignore those coalition governments which have sprung from domestic policies alone; for, to be exact, nearly every government is a coalition of some sort, if not between men of opposed parties, at least between elements in one party of widely differing roots. So Joseph Chamberlain served both Salisbury, who had served Derby, who had served both Grey and Peel, and Gladstone, who had served Palmerston, who had served Liverpool, who had served Pitt, who had served Shelburne, who had served both Bute and Chatham. Any one such political genealogy will show that clear-cut lines have been much the exception in our party history. The frontier, then, between what is a coalition, and what is not, is to some extent a matter of definition or of taste, but if somewhere it must be drawn, the coalitions which were not based upon great wars might be reduced to four.

There was first *the* Coalition between Fox and North. Its life was short, only a bare nine months of 1783, its performance hectic, its birth unnatural. Mutual hatred (of Shelburne or of the King) and mutual cynicism (as to reform) were its bonds, uniting men whose past was so antipathetic to one another that they could find union only in the huge insignificance of the third Duke of Portland. The great excluded, the King and William Pitt and the people, joined forces to break this ruining hypocritical alliance.

Then there was the Ministry of 1806-7, so oddly styled, of All the Talents. This too lived only a little while, liked it not, and died—at the King's hand. Grenville was its leader, he with the oblong head, and its talents were in part composed of those whom Pitt had wished to include in his last government, Grenvilles and Fox Whigs, and in part of Addingtonians, whose incompetence Grenville and Fox had thrown out of office in 1804, and Pitt in 1805. Its life was spent in illusion and insincerity. For Fox found himself forced to carry on the foreign policy which for twenty years he had reprobated, while the Catholic Emancipation to which he and Grenville were

pledged must silently be put to sleep, if they were to keep Addington. So in friction and some squalor, helped by a tardy dose from "the Doctor", this Ministry expired, and so heavy is the price paid by national governments for carrying nonentities who claim to represent a third party.

LORD ABERDEEN AND THE CRIMEA

WE come next to the government of Lord Aberdeen, 1852-5, which waged in the Crimea what is often, though it would seem without convincing ground, called a coalition war. Its descent was honourable and its abilities conspicuous, including in Lansdowne a survivor of the Talents of 1806 and three Prime Ministers, other than its chief, in Russell, Palmerston and Gladstone. But it was the child of extreme old age out of a youthful party, and this crabbed age and youth led an in-and-out, cup and ball, ding-dong life together. The Peelites had no numbers, yet all or more than half the talents, and much more than their share of the Cabinet; their Whig colleagues had a party, but one stricken by years and ill-knit. For if John Russell had a hereditary claim to demand parliamentary reform on any and every occasion, and while their Radical wing asked even more, wherever the white hat of "Pam" shone over the tournament, Reform would bite the dust. The single shock needed to drive them apart was found in war, for which Palmerston, who had served both parties faithfully in turn, was the only possible leader. Yet as an aftermath of that war this coalition, though ever undermining and disliking one another, was restored, until on Palmerston's grave Gladstone planted the tree of Liberalism.

Twenty years then passed of intense party strife under Gladstone and Disraeli, each leading a party new-forged by himself. But the life of party is but a span long, lasting only until some new cause arises which it mishandles or which it cannot face, and as it happened the Liberal leader had the more Conservative outlook. In part over Ireland, but in part also over social reform and imperial policy, both the Chamberlain school of Radicals and the Hartington shoal of Whigs broke away from him, but it took ten years before they were both merged under the catholic Conservative standard of Salisbury. If this began as coalition, it ended in fusion, thus passing out of our survey. Once at least, when both Gladstonian Liberalism and the Conservatism indoctrinated by Chamberlain found themselves in the presence of a third party, representing much which they had too long ignored, as well as face to face with heavy national danger, once, in 1910, men from either side reached hands across the gulf to make another national party. But vested and entrenched interests broke off their grasp, not to be attempted again until another sort of coalition had so far wrecked Liberalism that it must ask to be absorbed.

THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF 1931

OUR fourth instance of this type was the National Government of 1931-5 which, beginning as deliberate but reluctant coalition, and ending in inevitable and comparatively harmonious fusion, suggested more than one moral in the anatomy of this subject. The immediate reason for its formation,

the decline and imminent peril of the national finances, was weighty, and the patriotic sacrifices made were real and measurable. And it made a part of a development which would in all probability have gradually come about on other issues, that is, a branching of part of Labour to the right, and of many Conservatives to the left. Yet the effects of such sudden or abnormal unions, made from the top downwards, can be unwholesome. Our electoral system is such that a genuine third party, which may stand for something genuine in the national mind, finds it difficult at such a time to win adequate expression, while the mere fact of such a coalescence much embitters the party outpaced by its leaders. Of a third effect there was, in this particular case, no doubt. Coalitions enhance the ills to which all things human, Cabinets included, are subject; they are apt to mean that office cannot be distributed according to fitness, that legislation settles down on the common mean, that policy is dilatory and compromised.

LEADERSHIP AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

For all that, the British party system, which is true to the difficulties of freely held opinion and freely lived lives, has for that very reason a power within it to reflect national unities. In five great wars of the past two centuries and a half, which this country has waged either for its present existence or for its future, coalition governments directed policy and sacrifice at their height. Each has been associated with a great man: John Churchill, the two Pitts, Lloyd George and Winston Churchill. History must add that in each of the first four examples coalition perished well before its leader. To blame Harley for the fall of Marlborough, George III for that of both the Pitts, or the Conservative party for that of Lloyd George, would be easy but unsatisfying. War governments necessarily take on something of the nature of dictatorship which, and not coalition, is what "England does not love". The offence may take any form in different ages, may be a Sarah Jennings, or language not heard west of Constantinople, or an undue loyalty to friends, or a garden suburb, but it comes back to the same in the end, an insulation from the political heart of Britain. And then an instrument of destiny, an Abigail Masham or a Bute or a Loughborough, will be found ready waiting, though without real causes they would have little power indeed.

RISKS OF WAR-TIME COALITIONS

In war offences must needs come, even offences of which the coalition or its leader may in fact be guiltless. Marlborough went down because his name was used to defend indefensible conditions of peace and unsuccessful war in Spain; Chatham not only because his structure was built in war, which became unliked, but because his conception of the proper peace was abhorrent to a much wider circle than George III's. Or again, out of the strains of war, there springs some new issue intrinsically separate, but long brewing and at length given its chance, as Ireland destroyed Chatham's son. Or, finally, when war itself is over, the coalition

leaders may seem to be prolonging its atmosphere, or exploiting its aftermath, or ruling through men of action who do not chime with a nation at peace.

From this summary rehearsal of coalitions in the past it would seem that each must be judged upon its merits. If there is any common moral it appears merely to be this, that the dangers to which they are exposed multiply in more than geometrical proportion. For they are, in their very essence, the product of power, passion, sacrifice and exhaustion, all of which must test and wear, without ceasing, human character and judgment. Two hundred and fifty years ago the senior surviving symbol of the Cavaliers, the second son of the great Clarendon, in publishing his father's "History" prefaced it with an appeal that Whig and Tory should cleave together in defending the true interest of the kingdom, "the plainest thing in the world, it is what everybody in England finds and feels and knows to be right, and they are not long a-finding it neither". It is of that testing margin of judgment, and not fundamentally through the occasions, faction or personalities by which fate deals the blow, that coalitions have made their heavy miscalculation and gone down.

II. THE PRESENT SITUATION

MR. CHURCHILL's government will be four years old in May. It is based on a House of Commons originally elected in 1935, containing now some 360 Conservatives, 165 Labour members, 45 Liberals and 40 others, including Independents. Posts in the Ministry are not proportionately distributed. Their allocation is more even. Indeed the present War Cabinet consists of three Conservatives (Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden and Mr. Lyttelton), three Labour representatives (Mr. Attlee, Mr. Bevin and Mr. Morrison), and two non-party men (Sir John Anderson and Lord Woolton).

Personal disagreements there may be on this or that, but there is no reason whatever to expect destructive schisms among those eight. This coalition is not likely to split spontaneously from internal stresses at the top. Ever since May 1940, through bad times and good, the War Cabinet has remained a sufficiently coherent and united body. Changes in its individual composition have resulted from the simple course of events, but never from personal or political quarrels. Its members have ever been united to win the war, and united in looking up to Mr. Churchill as the nation's leader. It is no secret, either, that a good deal of personal respect crossing party boundaries has grown up between them.

A BID FOR POST-WAR UNITY

IN a Sunday evening broadcast a year ago the Prime Minister appealed for a continuance of all-party co-operation into the first years of peace. With reasonable give-and-take, he suggested, everyone could find a sufficient basis for agreement on a Four-Year-Plan of social reconstruction. It was a bid for domestic unity, such as might enable Britain to throw her weight and influence solid and undivided into the councils of the world outside.

So far, as a bid, it has failed—yet not for want of evidence that broad

fields of agreement about ultimate purposes exist. An inconsistency was latent in that Sunday broadcast, which quickly came to light but has not so quickly been resolved. The Prime Minister postulated a general election, soon after hostilities against Germany were ended, and the south-east coast was no longer a front-line area, and polling could take place without risk of bombs interfering between the opening of the poll and the counting of the votes. Everybody is at one about the case for dissolving the 1935 Parliament and giving the electors a new and free opportunity to declare their choice at the earliest moment that circumstances will permit. But how can their choice be truly free, if the candidate of the party previously holding the seat receives a letter of commendation from Mr. Churchill, who in public estimation towers over every other political figure in the country? The experience of the 1918 election, which was held within a month of the armistice and sent to Westminster a Parliament quite unworthy of its mountainous responsibilities, proves the dangers and guarantees the unpopularity of that so-called solution.

WHAT SORT OF COALITION?

YET what other course would offer any hope of preserving or re-creating coalition? Can it be seriously maintained that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Attlee—the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister—could sit together in the War Cabinet up to polling day, conducting the remainder of the war, and in all their work behind closed doors on reconstruction plans, assuming the continuance of coalition, while simultaneously leading their party forces in the election battle of paper and words? At the least it would be an odd and precarious sort of coalition which survived, with the acute national danger of 1940 no longer present, and every existing tension heightened by the sharp feelings which an election stimulates and leaves behind. In politics nothing is impossible, but slender are the chances of Britain getting a strong government that way.

In any case the decision is likely to be forced; the leaders, who might manage to work out some compromise plan if left to themselves, will hardly be granted the power of determining. At a party conference in 1940 the Labour party agreed to enter a coalition government to win the war, and a pledge has been given that when the war with Germany is ended another party conference will be called to decide whether the party truce at elections shall be ended also. Unless an amazing change takes place before then in the attitude of the Labour rank-and-file, the vote seems likely to go heavily in favour of ending it, whatever advice Mr. Attlee and the other leaders may offer. The party feels that for years it has been artificially under-represented in Parliament, thanks to the truce. What more natural than a popular resolve to end it at all costs?

SHORTCOMINGS IN PRACTICE

It is not as if the coalition system of government ever evoked natural enthusiasm anywhere, except among people whose excellent intentions are matched by a lack of historical or political experience. Iron national unity

was needed in 1940, and without an all-party government it would have been unprocurable. But no one who has watched the House of Commons at work these last four years could cry up the system as an unqualified success. Over a period of two centuries this country has grown accustomed to operate successfully a lively form of parliamentary democracy, with a government which should govern manfully yet watchfully, and an opposition taking, as its unceasing duty, vigilance, tempered by awareness that it will probably have to assume the responsibility of office if it throws the government out.

For four years there has been practically no professional vigilance at Westminster, and certainly no alternative government. Watchfulness accordingly ceased to be a universal characteristic of Ministers. As a result, the general public has acquired a not ill-founded feeling that "bureaucracy" has extended its influence over daily life and affairs more widely than the hard facts of conducting a war necessitate; and bureaucracy is foremost among the dragons which every Englishman looks to his member of Parliament to slay and keep on slaying. The effects of a lower level of efficiency in the Chamber, at question-time and in the cut-and-thrust of debate, thus seep downwards to aggravate a sense of unsettlement, which must be reckoned in the balance against the opposite sense of satisfaction that party fights are stilled. Within Parliament, meanwhile, the absence of a proper and official Opposition party tends to bestow undue prominence and publicity on individual members, in all parties, whose desire to criticize outruns their loyalty to their leaders and brings them constantly, oftentimes waspishly, to their feet.

SOME UNHAPPY CONSEQUENCES

IN contrast with that type, some of the best and soundest men in all parties, below Ministerial level, may be granted less than their fair chance in the parliamentary arena. Under normal conditions of party government the Cabinet brings its Bills and proposals down to the House, and there on the floor comes the clash, with principles stated and attacked and defended from either side, and a thousand opportunities for the back-bencher with integrity as well as ability to make his mark. He and his like may be the salt of the Parliament, and from among them the future leaders of the country are likely to emerge.

But under an all-party government, nearly everything which reaches the House of Commons is a compromise already. The battle of party principles has had to be fought out in the Cabinet room, with all too great a danger of its ending in deadlock and inaction, with the Prime Minister too busy on other and more immediately urgent or interesting matters to give his whole strength to insisting on a genuine decision. At best, if party attitudes are in any way involved, an emasculated policy is likely to reach the Commons. The best kind of loyalty then makes the best of the back-benchers doubt whether they ought to risk shattering the unity of the government in war-time, by giving unrestrained utterance to their personal views and forcing the House to a division if necessary.

We have recently been seeing two of the least happy consequences of coalition. With the public clamouring for a clear lead on many reconstruction issues, government decisions have been held up far too long, and manifestly through the difficulty of obtaining agreement at Cabinet level. The policies announced by a party government might have been more controversial, but in the normal course they would have been promulgated quicker, and cynical doubts whether it was really intended to do anything at all would have had a shorter start.

Secondly—and perhaps in the long run this is the more damaging evil—the present government shares the almost unavoidable characteristic of coalitions, in that it is elderly. Whenever two or three parties come together, room has to be found in the Ministry for the senior men from each. By so much are there fewer opportunities to try out the younger men who have never held office. Promotion is half-blocked, and the training and testing of those who may be leaders ten years hence is slowed down. In the easiest of times this would be a loss. Just now, when the country is unanimous that the problems of peace will demand minds fresh and vigorous, it is a calamity.

THE DETERMINING FACTOR

THE degree of success which Mr. Churchill's government can attain in producing, during 1944 and despite all difficulties, statements of reconstruction policy such as will satisfy the public demand for a real programme, will largely determine how long coalition can last. Winning the war will not, by itself, suffice to convince the electorate that the same coalition ought to be trusted with the peace. A series of first-rate White Papers on post-war social issues might lead the man in the street to decide that any party which broke up the coalition would lose his vote. But in default of that the omens for its prolonged survival are inauspicious; and if that means that the next Parliament will revert to working on clear-cut party lines, it need not be cause for regret unmitigated.

Lord Woolton as Minister of Reconstruction has been but three months in office, and it is still too early to gauge the impact of his personality and powers upon the situation. In the meantime no one in Britain need work himself into a frenzy of apprehension over the political future. As a nation we often discover a way rather well through puzzling mists like these. He would be more usefully occupied, as a citizen, in finding out what candidates are likely to come forward in his constituency at the next general election and, if he is not satisfied with their quality, in making sure that better ones are sought. For no government can redeem a bad Parliament, but the power of a good Parliament to make a good government is almost unlimited.

GERMANY FROM WITHIN

WILL THERE BE A CRACK?

WILL there be a crack in Germany? As the European war moves to its climax the question is certain to be asked more and more. The answer is not easy. All that it is safe to assume is that whatever change may occur inside Germany will be the direct outcome of military developments. At a certain stage of the war a combination of the High Command and the big industrialists may organize a *coup* for the forcible elimination of Hitler and his immediate collaborators. That was already being quietly and seriously talked about in the later months of 1943, if some Swedish observers in touch with German tendencies are to be believed. A mass movement of desperation against the régime is also conceivable if, for example, bombing ever reaches the point of human unbearableness. It is important to distinguish between such a movement which springs from individual sorrow, and a popular uprising which is concerned about the better ordering of German life within the European family of nations. There is, it has to be recognized, no present evidence whatever of a new dynamic in Germany. The taunt that the only people in Europe to be cowed by the Gestapo is the German may be cynical, but it is not without truth.

When the National Socialists say that a repetition of the November of 1918 is out of the question this time, the claim is not to be dismissed as a mere boast. There is a vast and vital difference between this war and the last, and to ignore it is to foster illusions. Whatever may have been the case earlier, the war has now reached a point when we can dispense with illusions. Under the Hohenzollerns in the Four Years' War the German people enjoyed what, in comparison with the servitude of the Hitler system, was freedom of opinion. Certainly the Social Democrats, with their millions of members, their highly accomplished press, their virile trade unions, and their magnificent co-operative movement, were mostly supporters of the Kaiser's war; but criticism and agitation were never effectually stifled. The Independent Socialists grew in power, the Communists carried on their propaganda, the Liberals and the Centre declined to keep silence on crucial occasions, and there were strikes in the war industries. From the first days of his campaign Hitler based his case on the argument of the "stab in the back"—that Germany did not lose the war but was let down by the home front. It is a fraudulent argument, exposed by no one more thoroughly than by Ludendorff, who was Hitler's partner in the melodramatic Munich *Putsch*. Germany was—as Ludendorff avowed—decisively defeated in the field before the home front caved in and gave in. What, however, is equally certain is that the men at the front reacted, not immediately but gradually, to the mood of their kith and kin at home. Hitler and his National Socialists have seen to it that there shall not be a repetition in this war. This is at the bottom of their boast that whatever happens to Germany to-day she will not be stabbed in the back.

NATIONAL SOCIALIST RULE

THERE is no occasion to go over the story of the subjugation of Germany to National Socialist rule. Everyone is familiar, or ought to be, with it—the regimenting and dragooning, the elimination of all opposition, and the destruction of independence of judgment. *Gleichschaltung* has become a word of monstrous meaning, and it was as saddening as it was significant to note how few Germans made any real resistance to the process in the early years of Hitler's reign. Why, with some heroic exceptions, the whole democratic and liberal movement in Germany tamely succumbed to the process is one of the major mysteries—and calamities—of the twentieth century. Succumb it did. The means employed were formidable enough. The new leaders of Germany did what the Weimar republicans never attempted and probably never wished; they made a complete purge of all Government offices and all agencies of the State. They saw to it that every centre of influence, from the Ministry in the Wilhelmstrasse to the village school, was brought under direct National Socialist authority. Nothing escaped them. The rubber-stamp Reichstag was only one of the more blatant examples. The elimination of every oppositional cell—to use the contemporary word—was decreed and enforced. It would be both foolish and dangerous to underrate the success of the National Socialists in immobilizing any and every source of resistance. For all practical purposes the success was decisive. Much of it has been due to the work of Himmler, undoubtedly one of the most sinister men called to safeguard the régime. That he has always chosen to keep himself out of the public notice is typical of his technique. He prefers to exercise power rather than to parade it.

Himmler is, after Hitler, perhaps the most powerful man in Germany to-day. In the S.S., the Gestapo, and many other acknowledged and unacknowledged organizations he has complete control of mass opinion and of individuals. He has the most detailed dossier of all Germans in any kind of official position, not excluding their sex life and financial standing. He receives, and has tabulated, the reports of the wardens whose duty it is to supervise blocks of flats and to learn what the tenants are feeling and saying. It is not too much to say that no item of German life escapes his scrutiny. Nowhere and never has so wide a system of spying been elaborated. With the more open manifestations of Himmler's power, such as the beheadings and the imprisonings, the outside world is fairly familiar; but the watch he maintains on private lives is less well known. There have been sporadic acts of sabotage, and there have been so-called subversive activities—such as those which were brought to light in Munich last year, when certain university students and at least one professor were brought to trial and sentenced to death. Such incidents, however, serve merely to show up the completeness of the stranglehold on the convictions and the actions of the mass of the nation. The disappearance of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, which contrived to maintain a sense of responsibility, left no doubt about the closeness of the watch. German refugees in Great Britain and the United States are inclined to emphasize the strength of the underground movement inside

the Reich, and it is true enough that such a movement exists and is sustained by much sacrificial effort; but, on the disclosed facts, it would be wrong to suppose that the movement constitutes an organized opposition capable of threatening the stability of the régime. When, therefore, Hitler claims that there is no comparison between 1918 and 1944 he is, for once at least, speaking the truth.

THE WAR AND THE PEOPLE

It is probably true to say that on the whole the German people did not enter the war with any deep enthusiasm. There were, for example, none of the unbridled demonstrations of national feeling which took place in 1914 and which so impressed some susceptible neutrals. The members of the National Socialist party, with its many ramifications, and of the *Wehrmacht*, obsessed with ideas of *revanche*, were an obvious exception. They unfeignedly welcomed the war. It gave them at once the chance to affirm their faith in the *Führer* and to show their contempt for the decadent democracies. They were mainly of the new or Hitler generation. More elderly Germans, who remembered only too well the disillusionments of the last war and were affrighted by the social chaos and inevitable inflation of a lost war, were more restrained. They had few cheers for the men setting off for the front in 1939. It was the existence of this older generation which encouraged and seemed to justify the theory, widely held in Great Britain and France for a time, that a distinction must be drawn between the National Socialists and the nation, and that sooner or later a split between the two which would overthrow the war-makers would show itself. The theory was particularly favoured in the "phoney" phase of the war—the so-called *drôle de guerre*. It fitted in neatly with the defensive strategy deliberately adopted by the allied command, and with the idea that the inexorable pressure of the blockade would help powerfully to make Germany see reason. It may even have derived in part from Hitler's own technique of gaining victories through bloodless war—only he made certain that he had the resources ready to fight mercilessly when to fighting it came.

In the event most Germans, whether of the party or not, acclaimed the conquest of Poland, as they later did the invasion of Denmark and Norway and the military overthrow of the Low Countries and France. By the midsummer of 1940 the war was genuinely popular: the downfall of the British Isles was confidently and jubilantly awaited. The bombing of London and other towns was admired without any mental reservations. Was not Europe at Germany's feet—and was not Germany at Britain's throat? The *Führer* had triumphed, and his standing in the Fatherland was at its peak. That sufficed. This was the German, as it was the National Socialist, apogee. The British beat the bomber, as much by guts as by guns, and the shock to the average German of the failure to subjugate Great Britain might have been indeed serious if it had not been for the spectacular course of the Russian campaign in its opening stage. The recovery of morale was destined to be only temporary; for the war began to develop along lines which

neither the German Command nor the German people had really contemplated.

CAN WAR BE WON BY BOMBING?

A REVOLUTIONARY factor has to be noted here, and that is the bomber aircraft. It is unnecessary to enter into the controversy whether an overwhelming air force can or cannot so demoralize a nation as to enforce capitulation. That theory remains to be proved. What is relevant is the effect of bombing on a people as inclined to the glorification of war as the German. First let it be noted, without any delving into the higher strategy of the Allied Command, that a certain number of people in Great Britain—including, it can be acknowledged, some who are sincere and not without influence—have expressed physical pain and a sort of spiritual nausea when they have read the accounts of Bomber Command's "saturation" raids on German towns. They are fundamental patriots, and their point of view has to be respected because it springs from the deepest emotion. Many thousands of German civilians—men, women and children—have already been killed, and thousands more will be killed before the *Wehrmacht* recognizes its own helplessness by asking for an armistice. The prospect is not pleasant. Does not, however, such revulsion in fact betray a wholly false humanitarianism?

What is the crucial fact of all modern German wars? Is it not the over-riding determination to ensure that the Fatherland should not be the scene of the fighting? All German strategy has been based on the offensive, which, stripped of every euphemism, means no more than carrying the war, with all its horrors and havoc, into the enemy's homeland. It is, in short, the apotheosis of the gangster's principle of getting his own shot in first. The wars of 1866 (against Austria), of 1870 (against France), of 1914 (against the Triple Entente), and of 1939 (against Poland and, eventually, against Europe) exemplify the principle. When Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the *Luftwaffe*, assured the German people that not a single enemy bomb would fall on Germany, he was expressing not merely a boast but an article of German faith. It is worth while to recall the shock, and even panic, which Germany experienced when in the early days of the war of 1914-18 Russian forces adventurously thrust into East Prussia. The taste of invasion they gave the German people was neither long nor severe, but it was enough. There were hurried conferences at the Kaiser's Great Headquarters; old Hindenburg was brought out of his retirement; much needed divisions were diverted from the Western front; and when Hindenburg, with the counsel and leadership of Ludendorff and Hoffmann, freed the Fatherland from fear by the victory of Tannenberg the popular gratitude and acclaim were overwhelming. To-day Bomber Command and the American Air Force have between them brought to the German people the fullest realization of what invasion involves. The significance of Goebbels's admission late in 1943, "Germany is learning what war means", cannot be overrated. His own intention was clearly to steel the people at home to greater endurance by reminding them that what they were suffering by bombing was after all only the regular and accepted experience of the men at the front.

The theory that the German war can be won by bombing is weightily challenged: what is not open to dispute is the profound effect which bombing has had on the German mind—on the so-called *Stimmung*. That conclusion does not rest on the carefully checked official reports from Allied sources alone. It is based rather on information from inside Germany itself. That which Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians, French, British, Yugoslavs, Greeks and Russians have borne has now stricken the German people. War has ceased to be *fröhlich*: it has become a vast horror. Asseverations that Berlin or Brunswick, Hamburg or Leipzig, Cologne or Essen, can “take it” are, up to a point, true enough, but certainly irrelevant. The essential—and, for the German leaders both of the party and of the armed forces, frightening—fact is rather that they are having to “take it”. That is a new experience. Bombing, then, is doing more than lay waste the centres of German war industry: it is at the same time destroying the German obsession that the highest earthly glory was to be won only in battle beyond the frontiers. This it is which endows the horrible with hope.

STABILITY OF THE HOME FRONT

THE success of the National Socialists in maintaining the stability of the German home front through more than four years of war is not open to doubt, whatever may be said about the means adopted to attain the end. The working-class population has gone on producing the increasing volume of weapons which Hitler has demanded. Speer, whom he put in charge of armaments production, is an energetic and imaginative man, and labour unrest has, so far as can be learned, never yet hampered his plans. If there has been serious sabotage, the world has not heard of it. What interruption of war production has occurred has been due to the Anglo-American air offensive, reinforced by the more slowly working blockade. The discipline of German labour is the more noteworthy if it is recalled that when Hitler assumed power eleven years ago there were up to 12,000,000 professing Social Democrats and Communists. It would be too much to suppose that all have become loyal supporters of the régime, but it would also be wrong to suppose that the dissident minority is strong enough to oppose any outward resistance to Hitler. It is more reasonable to expect that the first signs of trouble will appear in the ranks of the 12,000,000 foreigners inside the Reich made up of prisoners of war and labour conscripts from all the enslaved countries. German commentators have estimated that one worker in every four is a foreigner, and there have been misgivings lest in bringing in so large a force of foreign labour the Trojan Horse itself has been admitted. Ley, the Leader of the Labour Front, Göring, Goebbels and others have been at pains to assure Germans that these foreigners do not constitute a potential Fifth Column. Göring indeed has spoken of them as “guest” workers. Sauckel, who is in charge of man-power inside and outside Germany and has become known as the slave-driver of Europe, has on the other hand issued a warning that the “dirty work” of industry must be done not by Germans but by these conscripts; and the most rigorous measures have been taken to prevent any mixing between them and the native popula-

tion. The presence of so large a foreign element, known to be hostile to Germany, is a definite source of weakness which may be expected to have the most serious consequences as the Allied military pressure grows. Germany in fact has built up her labour strength but has to that extent undermined her national structure.

The agricultural population has proved if anything a more stable factor than the German industrial population. For one thing—and it is important—it has not been exposed to the rigours of bombing. For another, it has done fairly well out of the war. Nor has *Blut und Boden* been without its appeal. A revolt of the peasants is not in sight. The Church, both Protestant and Catholic, has more than once raised its voice fearlessly in defence of the rights of religion and denunciation of Hitler's racial doctrines, and doubtless it will do so again when occasion offers; but the Church has not yet carried its resentment to the point of condemning the régime for its succession of aggressive wars. Less than ever is heard of the "German Christians", with their tribal heresies; and with the decline in their military fortunes the leaders of National Socialist Germany have shown a significant respect for orthodox religion. What remains? The middle-class is in no mood or condition to start a counter-revolution. Too many of its members are entangled as officials of either the State or the party machine, and in any case the middle class has already shown such a lack of fibre that it would be folly to look to it for an heroic gesture at this juncture.

A GENERATION DEBASED

MOREOVER experience of Italy since the formal overthrow of Fascism has taught us how utterly demoralized and debauched the intellectual and spiritual life of a people may become under dictatorial government. The régime in Italy was mild compared with what it has been and still is in Germany. Not merely has a whole generation been dragooned: it has been debased. This fact—in many ways a terrifying fact—is not always sufficiently weighed by students of Germany. It was suggested at the outset of this article that the overthrow of Hitler's system might come from a combination of the High Command and the big industrialists. Already there are indications that the direction of the military side of the war has passed under the control of the professional soldier and out of the hands of the party leader. From the German point of view that may be a good thing: victory and survival are more than a matter of "intuitions". From the point of view of the United Nations, however, it can mean only one thing. Whatever changes are brought about in Germany in the coming months will be the result of their own military action. The crack will come from without, not from within.

WAR CRIMES

MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LÉgal PROBLEMS

FEW questions are more difficult than those concerned with the punishment of war criminals because, although there is general agreement that such punishment should be meted out at the conclusion of the war, there is no agreement on the practical steps that will have to be taken to put this decision into effect. Thus there are differences of opinion concerning the persons to be punished, the law to be applied in the various cases and the tribunals which are to try the prisoners. This lack of unanimity is not surprising because the problem, while at first sight a simple one, involves complicated and difficult questions of morality, politics and law. Although the legal aspect is the one which has been most emphasized, this is only because it is the most obvious and concrete one, but, in fact, it is the other two which are less easily soluble. The law is a machine by which particular ends can be achieved, and if the ends themselves are not clear and certain then the law cannot function successfully. This is especially true in the case of war crimes because when we deal with them we are concerned both with administering the law as it is at present, and with laying the foundations of a new and better international society. It is this attempted reconciliation between the present and the future which makes the solution so complex, especially from the moral standpoint. As this is the most important one, although it is the one which seems to have been discussed least, it is convenient to treat it first. No attempt will be made to answer all the various questions raised here, it being the chief purpose of this article to state the problems which will have to be considered before a final solution can be reached.

I. THE MORAL PROBLEM

THE first moral problem concerns the moral guilt of those who are responsible for the various wars such as the German attack on Poland, and the Japanese on the American fleet at Pearl Harbour. At first sight the answer seems to be so obvious as hardly to require formulation, but on further consideration it is not quite so clear. In the Middle Ages, under the influence of the Catholic Church, an attempt was made to differentiate between just and unjust wars, but this distinction, which it was impossible to draw in practice, became of less and less importance until in the nineteenth century it finally disappeared from the pages of books on international law. The doctrine of neutrality is in truth nothing more than a tacit recognition that there is no way of determining whether one State has committed a wrong in attacking another provided a minimum of hardship is caused to third parties. An attempt to change this view was made by the creation of the League of Nations, but the rules of the League were only binding on its own members, and even then to an uncertain degree. For one thing, if aggressive war was

regarded as a moral wrong, why did not the League expel those of its members who embarked on such adventures? A further attempt to establish the moral wrongfulness of war was made in the Pact of Paris, 1928, popularly known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, but its provisions were lacking both in precision and in effectiveness. Certainly within a short period after the conclusion of the Pact its provisions were repeatedly violated, and no steps were taken to denounce these violations as moral wrongs.

Undoubtedly there is universal agreement that, in the future, aggressive wars must be recognized as constituting a moral wrong, but if they were not so recognized in 1939, is there any moral justification (entirely apart from any legal question) for punishing those who began the war? It is this doubt which has influenced some persons to take the view that the so-called war crime of having declared war should be dealt with as a political matter, and should not be confused with the clear moral wrongs which have been committed in the course of the war itself.

Perhaps this part of the problem can be illustrated by stating two conflicting propositions which have been advanced. Those who advocate punishment argue that unless those responsible for starting the war are adequately punished *now* no advance in international morality can be made in the future, while those who oppose such punishment argue that it is not just to punish a man for an act which was not recognized as being morally wrong when he committed it, and that such punishment may have the effect of turning him into a martyr.

The second moral problem concerns the responsibility of an officer or soldier who is executing a superior order which he knows or ought to know is wrongful. A concrete example is the responsibility of the German soldiers who carried out the massacre of Lidice. It is generally accepted that there can be no moral responsibility if the soldier had no means of knowing that the act was wrongful as, for example, in the execution of a man unjustly condemned as a spy. But what is the position where a man of reasonable intelligence would realize that the act was contrary to the standards of civilized behaviour? Must he as a soldier obey the order with unquestioning obedience? There is a strong school of thought which argues that in such a case a soldier commits no moral wrong because it is his duty to obey, and that, if he failed to do so, he would himself be executed. It is said that no man can be required to sacrifice his life in such circumstances. But there is another school of thought which rejects this view, and which holds that fear of punishment, however severe, cannot excuse a soldier who commits an act which he knows or ought to know is wrongful. This moral view was expressed by Lord Coleridge, Lord Chief Justice, in the famous murder case* when he said:

"To preserve one's life is generally speaking a duty, but it may be the plainest and the highest duty to sacrifice it. War is full of instances in which it is a man's duty not to live, but to die."

The choice in these circumstances is undoubtedly a hard one, but it is no

* *Regina v. Dudley* (1884), 14 Q.B.D. 273.

harder than many others which men may have to make. The real difficulty, which has not been sufficiently emphasized in the literature on this subject, arises when we have to determine whether the soldier ought to have known that the act was wrongful. Obviously moral obtuseness is no excuse, for a man who kills another cannot be excused on the ground that he is so stupid that he does not realize that it is wrong to kill a fellow human being. But his lack of intelligence may prevent him from understanding the circumstances in which the act is being done. Thus a soldier who shoots a hostage may believe that this is a justifiable reprisal for a wrongful act committed against his own army; in these circumstances is his act morally wrongful? This is not a legal question but a moral one, and it is because no clear answer has been given by the moralists that the law is uncertain on this point.

PUNISHMENT REFORMATIVE AND DETERRENT

THE third moral problem involves the whole issue concerning the basis of punishment. Is there a moral duty on the United Nations to punish the war criminals, or is this a case where we ought to forgive our enemies? Probably everyone is agreed that punishment ought to be applied when it is reformative in character, but that will hardly arise in the case of the war crimes, although it has been suggested that the members of the Gestapo should be forced to undergo a rehabilitation course in citizenship. Nor is there much greater difficulty when the punishment is deterrent in character, although some persons have doubted whether such punishment is justified. Is it morally right to punish A so as to teach B a lesson? Should a war criminal be executed to-day so that the example will prevent others in the future from committing similar wrongful acts? Perhaps the moral justification for such deterrent punishments is that A by committing the wrongful act is encouraging B to act in a similar manner, and therefore it is right that this fact should be taken into consideration in fixing his liability. The real difficulty arises, however, when the justification of retributive punishment has to be considered. Is it right to requite evil with evil? Does justice require that the wrongdoer should be punished even if such punishment cannot be of benefit either to him or to others? Kant had no hesitation in answering this question in the affirmative, holding that it would be our moral duty to execute the last murderer even if we knew that the whole world would end to-morrow. In recent years there has been a strong reaction against this doctrine—with the result that many believe that the idea of retribution as a principle of punishment is unjustifiable. This problem is a particularly difficult one to answer in the case of war crimes because on the one hand it is necessary to guard against the desire for pure vengeance, while on the other it is important that the people's demand for justice should not be frustrated. In particular it is important to remember that, while there may be a moral duty to forgive those who have wronged oneself, this duty of forgiveness does not extend to those who have wronged others. It is essential that such countries as the United States and Great Britain, which have not suffered the horrors of invasion, should remember this, for they may be accused of

pharisaical hypocrisy if they, by insisting too strongly on strict legal rules in these cases, do anything to hinder the punishment of the wrongdoers.

This list of the various moral problems which are connected with the question of war crimes is not a complete one, but it gives some of the major issues which will have to be faced. It will not be easy to find the answer to some of them.

II. POLITICAL PROBLEMS

By political problems is meant those questions of policy which fall within the sphere of statesmen rather than within that of moralists or lawyers. These political problems are no less difficult than the moral ones, but fortunately they are less numerous. The first can be stated briefly: How can the war criminals be punished without running the risk of turning them into martyrs? It may be said that if the evidence is sufficiently clear and convincing then no question of martyrdom can arise, but where political passions are concerned then no evidence, however convincing, will be found sufficient. In the history of the world there have been many trials of a political nature, but it is difficult to remember a single one which has persuaded the supporters of the prisoner that he was guilty. For that matter, many of these trials have had the opposite effect, for they have given the condemned prisoner an opportunity of making a speech from the dock which has been remembered long after the rest of the trial has been forgotten. The trial of Robert Emmet is a striking illustration of this. It is the drama of the trial which tends to inflame passions rather than to allay them. This does not mean, of course, that such trials should never be held, for in many instances it is necessary to vindicate the law, even at the risk of making the prisoner a hero to his own people. But it does mean that we must recognize that there is a conflict of advantages and disadvantages involved in them, and that these must be weighed carefully in each instance. There is a danger in either too many or too few trials.

The second political problem can be stated thus: Is the primary purpose of these trials to prove to the people of the prisoner's country that he was guilty of the crime charged against him, or is it to prove to the people of the victims' country that the crimes committed against them have been fairly and adequately punished? The methods we shall choose in prosecuting those accused of these crimes will depend in large part on which purpose we consider the dominant one, for if we accept the first then the emphasis will be placed on an impartial neutral court, while if we accept the second we shall favour the more efficient method of the domestic tribunal as exemplified by the Kharkov trials. It was on this point that Lord Cecil and Lord Vansittart differed in their recent letters to *The Times*, for the former wanted the trials to be held in Germany so as to show the Germans how fairly they were being conducted, while the latter urged that they should be held in the liberated countries so that the victims should realize that the wrongdoers were being adequately punished. Here again there is a conflict of interests which will require careful consideration.

These political and moral problems are the primary ones which must be

solved before the lawyers are called on to devise the proper legal machinery; this can be done with comparatively little difficulty when the answers to the former are known. It is because we are not really certain what we want to do that the legal problems arising from the prosecution of war crimes seem to be so difficult and complicated.

III. THE LEGAL PROBLEMS

IN 1919 Clemenceau in his speech of acceptance of the Presidency of the Peace Conference said:

"The first question is as follows: 'the responsibility of the authors of the war.' The second is: 'penalties for crimes committed during the war.'"

These are two distinct questions which ought to be considered separately; but unfortunately they have been confused in the public mind, with the result that the punishment of true war crimes has been hindered.

The difficulty from the legal standpoint of trying those who are the authors of the war is that it is doubtful whether they can be charged with any determinate crime. No such crime is recognized by any system of state law, and, as has been said above, it is doubtful whether to declare a war, however unprovoked such a step may be, is a crime in international law. Moreover, since international law at present is only concerned with the States as the subjects of its rules, it is difficult to see how an individual can be held to have committed a crime at international law. This problem was not solved in 1919, when the Peace Conference decided on the trial of William II, because its language was studiously non-committal. Article 227 of the Versailles Treaty provides that:

"The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties."

But "international morality" is not "international law". Later, in their note to Holland, the Allied Powers emphasized "the special character of their demands, which contemplate, not a juridical accusation, but an act of high international policy". It is clear therefore that the ex-Emperor was not charged with having committed a specific crime either under international law or under state law. A similar difficulty would arise if such men as von Ribbentrop or Goebbels or Hitler himself, whose case is considered later, were to be tried to-day. What determinate crime have they committed? The same question will arise in the case of the Gestapo because being a member of that body is not a crime *per se* either in international or in state law. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to frame a legal charge against them.

PROCEDURE IN NAPOLEON'S CASE

Does it follow from this that these men must escape unpunished? The answer is that, although the ordinary process of a legal trial is not appropriate

in their cases, they can be punished by a political Act of State. It was this procedure which was adopted in the case of Napoleon, for he was dealt with by direct State action. The Prince Regent told him in a letter that this action was necessary in order not to give him "any further opportunity of disturbing the peace of Europe". There is no reason why those men who have proved themselves to be a menace to the peace and civilization of the world should not be permanently or temporarily removed, but this does not mean that the misleading form of a judicial trial should be adopted to disguise what is rightly an act of high policy.

The second category referred to by Clemenceau was "crimes committed during the war". These are crimes in the true sense because they are acts done in violation of specific legal provisions, and are capable of trial by existing courts. It is necessary, however, to distinguish here between international law and the national laws of the various States. Without going into detail it may be said that the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906 and 1929, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the International Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War in 1929 established definite rules concerning the conduct of war which imposed restrictions on the combatant forces. Thus the killing of civilians or of prisoners is forbidden, the use of forced labour is severely restricted and pillage is declared to be unlawful. International law therefore forbids these acts, but there are two difficulties to be faced if a prosecution under international law were to be brought. The first is, as has been said above, that international law is concerned only with States and not with individual persons, so that a prosecution of an individual before an international court would constitute a radical departure from established practice. The second is that there is no existing machinery for such trials. On this point Viscount Sankey, Lord Chancellor, said in the leading case of *Re Piracy Jure Gentium* (1934), A.C. 586, 589:

"With regard to crimes as defined by international law, that law has no means of trying or punishing them. The recognition of them as constituting crimes, and the trial and punishment of the criminals, are left to the municipal law of each country."

If war crimes are to be tried by international courts it is necessary to recognize that both the substantive and procedural law which will be applied at such trials will have to be *ex post facto* in character. Whether this constitutes a serious objection to such trials is a difficult question. Most legal systems recognize that on principle *ex post facto* legislation is undesirable; but there may be exceptions to this rule if this is demanded by justice. This is particularly true in the case of war crimes because these are so contrary to all principles of decency and humanity that no general doctrine should stand in the way of adequate punishment. The crimes committed in this war have been so exceptional in character that it may require exceptional steps to deal with them.

There is, however, a second legal process applicable to these war crimes which is not subject to the criticism of being *ex post facto*—namely trial in

the courts of those States where the crimes have been committed. On this point Professor J. W. Garner said* :

"The killing by a soldier of a person belonging to the enemy's forces or the taking of private property in occupied territory are lawful acts of war only when they are done in the manner and subject to the conditions prescribed by international law, otherwise they are murder or theft as the case may be and their authors are liable to punishment as criminals. . . . Practically all the authorities are agreed that soldiers belonging to the enemy army may be tried by the courts of the opposing belligerent for crimes committed in violation of the laws of war in the latter's territory against the persons or property of nationals of the injured belligerent if they fall into his hands."

In a letter to *The Times* (December 28, 1943), Lord Atkin cast some doubt on this statement of the law by saying that "invading armies come not under the law of the invaded country, but against it. They owe it no allegiance and they receive no corresponding protection . . .", but this view seems to be contrary to the doctrine accepted at the Moscow Conference and since put into practice at the Kharkov trials. Nor does it seem logically tenable, for, as Professor Garner has said, "under the modern conception of occupation there is no extinction of sovereignty but only its temporary displacement". There are not many decided cases on this point, but at the end of the last war the French courts unanimously held that they had jurisdiction in all cases where German soldiers had committed crimes during the occupation of Northern France.

HOLLAND AND THE KAISER

Two important consequences follow from the view that war crimes are nothing more than ordinary crimes committed during war. The first is that the country in which such a crime has been committed will be entitled to ask for the extradition of any person *prima facie* guilty of having committed it if he has fled to a neutral country. It is particularly important in this connection to note that Holland, in refusing to surrender William II, stated that it could not "recognize an international duty to associate itself with this act of high international policy of the Powers", and that it had always regarded itself as "a refuge for the vanquished in international conflicts". It did not say that it was a refuge for criminals who, by violating the laws of war, had committed murder. The second important consequence of this doctrine is that acts of pillage must be regarded as ordinary robbery and theft, with the result that the property stolen can be followed into the hands of third parties. The United Nations have already issued a general warning that they will not recognize the validity of such transfers.

From the practical standpoint, also, there is much to be said for the trial of these cases by the national courts. As a general rule in ordinary state law a prisoner is tried at the place where the crime has been committed because the witnesses are probably there, and also because it is important that the

* *International Law and the World War*, vol. ii, pp. 472-7.

persons living in the locality should realize that justice has been done. To depart from this principle in the case of war crimes is to suggest that the various allied countries may be incapable of conducting trials fairly.

It has been said, however, that it will be necessary to establish international courts in three special instances. The first is where the crime has been committed in Germany against the national of another country. The answer to this is that the laws of most continental countries provide that their courts have jurisdiction to try certain crimes, such as murder, committed against their nationals abroad. Although English law contains no such provision, it is by no means clear that such crimes would not be covered by the jurisdiction of an English court-martial; but, in any case, it is probable that the law will be amended on this point.* The second instance is said to arise where one person has committed crimes in a number of different countries with the result that he is claimed by all of them. The answer to this is that the principle applicable to extradition proceedings should apply here. It is no novel situation in ordinary criminal law to find that the same prisoner is claimed by a number of different States, and that it is necessary to determine to which claim priority shall be given. The third instance is concerned with wrongs committed in Germany against German nationals, such as the German Jews, the members of the Communist party and some Roman Catholics. Here undoubtedly it will be necessary to create some new tribunal to try these cases, but what its constitution should be or what law it can administer is uncertain. It will certainly not be international law, for these crimes have been committed against German nationals themselves and not against foreign nationals. In this instance it may be necessary to recognize that these are crimes against human nature rather than against any established body of law, and that therefore they must be dealt with in accordance with natural justice.

THE CASE OF HITLER

ALTHOUGH it is unlikely that this problem will ever arise, it is interesting to consider what would be Hitler's legal position if he were to remain alive at the end of the war. Has he committed any crimes, and can he be tried for them? On the question of crimes it will be possible to charge him with murder, for he has given specific orders that a large number of civilians should be killed. There seem to be unlimited other crimes, including the transportation of Polish women to Germany, which can be traced direct to him. On the question of jurisdiction the point will arise whether as an ex-sovereign he can claim immunity in the courts of all countries on the ground that it is a rule of international law that a chief of State can never be held legally responsible. This was the view of the two American members of the legal commission of the 1919 Peace Conference; but it is now generally accepted that their conclusion was based on an incorrect interpretation of the rule. The immunity, in so far as it exists, is founded on considerations of international comity and public policy, and cannot be used to protect a

* See Lord Maugham's letter to *The Times*, December 24, 1943.

deposed chief of State. Even in national law a chief of State, such as the President of the United States, is not immune from legal process after he has been removed from office.

CONCLUSION

ALTHOUGH the prosecution of war criminals involves a consideration of the various problems discussed above, this does not mean that they are insoluble or that they should in any way prevent the proper and efficient administration of justice. There is no reason why these criminals should not be punished, and it is the moral duty of the United Nations to see that this is done.

FORTY YEARS ON

THE RHODES SCHOLARS IN RETROSPECT

IT is a difficult task to estimate the results of the Rhodes Scholarships after forty years of experience and to calculate how far they have justified the intentions and hopes of the founder. The influence of the Scholarships may be exerted in many different ways, and there can be no invariable touchstone of achievement and failure. One cannot hope to give more than a general impression of the careers and activities of Rhodes Scholars in different walks of life, and even then all conclusions must be regarded as approximate only.

ACADEMIC RECORD AT OXFORD

BEFORE considering this more important question it may be well to glance at the record of the Rhodes Scholars at Oxford itself. In judging their academic performance it is difficult to find a standard of comparison with other members of the University. A Rhodes Scholar presents no exact analogy to the English College Scholar or Exhibitioner, but some rough comparisons may be drawn between three groups of undergraduates: Rhodes Scholars, College Scholars and Exhibitioners, and ordinary undergraduate Commoners. In such a comparison it is assumed that Third Classes represent the rank and file of academic calibre, while First Classes represent men of outstanding ability, and First and Second Classes taken together represent men of more than average ability. On this basis the statistical comparison is as follows: 16.5 per cent of Rhodes Scholars have obtained First Classes in the Final Honour Schools, as against 27.9 per cent of College Scholars and Exhibitioners and 5.7 per cent of Commoners. If the First and Second Classes are bracketed together, 69.5 per cent of Rhodes Scholars have been ranked in these classes as against 76.4 per cent of College Scholars and Exhibitioners and 41.9 per cent of Commoners.

It must be repeated, however, that these figures are incomplete and, indeed, misleading unless the qualification is added that a large number of Rhodes Scholars read for research degrees, for which no Classes are awarded at Oxford. The figures also leave out of account the Classes for the Bachelor of Civil Law, a degree which a great many Rhodes Scholars have taken.

Among individual constituencies, and in respect of First Classes only, the best performance is that of New Zealand with 33.3 per cent (81.8 per cent of Firsts and Seconds together). Australia comes next with 32.1 per cent of First Classes (85 per cent Firsts and Seconds). The percentage of First Classes for the United States is 15.8 per cent (63.9 per cent Firsts and Seconds). This figure approximates to that of most British constituencies, and, if it seems unfavourable by comparison with the most academically successful Dominions, it must be remembered that the Oxford style of examination is more familiar to students from some of the Dominions than to most American students, and also that in recent years an increasing

number of American Rhodes Scholars have taken research degrees, often of conspicuous merit. The general academic record is not unimpressive when it is remembered that in most Final Honour Schools the proportion of First Classes does not go higher than 10 per cent of candidates, and in some cases is as low as 6 per cent.

ATHLETIC DISTINCTIONS

THE athletic contribution of Rhodes Scholars to Oxford sport has been considerable, but has often been greatly exaggerated. In early days there was a certain tendency to over-emphasize this qualification. For many years past, however, an effort has been made to put it in its right proportion, and indeed there is one school of thought which holds that at present too little importance is attached to it by Selection Committees.

Up to 1940, 521 Blues and Half Blues had been awarded to Rhodes Scholars, but these do not represent anything like 521 individual performers, since a certain number of Rhodes Scholars have won double and even triple Blues. Besides, the number is somewhat distorted by the fact that all American and Canadian Rhodes Scholars are at a disadvantage in those English sports of which they have had little or no previous experience. Cricket is unknown to them, and a first-rate American footballer may not be able to adapt himself to Rugby football, while the American style of rowing is quite different from the English. The number of Half Blues is therefore artificially swelled by certain games which are better known in North America than in England, and particularly by lacrosse. Up to 1937 the full Blues were distributed as follows: 71 in athletic sports, 46 in Rugby football, 11 in cricket and 5 in rowing. It will be seen, therefore, that only a comparatively small proportion of Rhodes Scholars are "athletes" in the popular sense; on the other hand, the great majority of them play some sort of game for their college, even though they may not achieve distinction. Few of them are what Rhodes described as "mere bookworms". The three most versatile athletes among Rhodes Scholars have all been South Africans. R. O. Lagden (South Africa and Oriel, 1908) won Blues in Rugby football, cricket, racquets and hockey, besides being a Rugby football international. He was killed in the last war, and in this war the Scholarships have lost another great all-rounder in H. D. Freakes (Natal and Magdalen, 1936). Another South African name equally famous on the Rugby and cricket fields and in the boxing ring is that of H. G. Owen Smith (Diocesan College, Rondebosch and Magdalen, 1930) now serving as a medical officer in the Middle East. Perhaps even better known is the name of J. E. Lovelock (New Zealand and Exeter, 1931), now a Major in the R.A.M.C., holder of the world record for the mile. No mention is made of those, considerable in number, who have captained various Oxford teams and won international caps.

An important aspect of the Rhodes Scholarships is the part which the Scholars play in the innumerable undergraduate activities of Oxford. When the writer was an undergraduate it was regarded as somewhat startling, not to say revolutionary, when a Rhodes Scholar was elected President of the

Junior Common Room in his college. It is now quite common to find Rhodes Scholars in this sort of position in University and College life, and indeed in every kind of undergraduate activity and interest. Four Rhodes Scholars have been Presidents of the Union—two Americans, one Canadian and one South African.

IN AFTER LIFE

So much for general performance at Oxford. The far more important question is the record and achievement of Rhodes Scholars in their subsequent careers. Here we must repeat the caution that any attempt to estimate how far they have fulfilled the hopes of the founder must depend, first, upon the interpretation of his intentions and, second, upon the standard of success which is applied. Rhodes Scholars move in many different spheres, large and small, in almost every part of the world; their vocations and opportunities vary enormously, and their status and influence must be judged relatively. It is possible, and it is not uncommon, for a Rhodes Scholar to display, within a comparatively limited circle, exactly the qualities of public spirit which the scholarship is intended to foster. Again, a large number of younger men are not yet established in life, and the oldest are now in their late fifties or early sixties. There is another purely practical difficulty in attempting, in print at least, any general appraisal. Some names stand out so conspicuously that they can be mentioned without hesitation; but in many fields—for example, in academic work, in the professions, or in authorship—it is difficult to mention individual names without appearing to be invidious. How, for instance, estimate a man's reputation for learning, or his standing in law or medicine, or the quality of his writings, without running the risk of doing injustice to others and perhaps of expressing merely subjective and debatable opinions? Any judgments which are attempted in what follows are subject to these reservations.

The total number of Rhodes Scholars elected up to 1940 was 2,190, about half-and-half British and American. Of these 62 were killed in the first world war, and up to the present time 17 have been lost in the present war, including, unhappily, some young recent scholars of exceptional promise. 135 have died of natural causes or by misadventure. This represents the high proportion of 6 per cent among men whose average age is not more than 40—a figure which is surprising and suggests that the gods must specially love Rhodes Scholars! Among those who have died prematurely have been men of excellent promise and high achievement—in particular Kingsley Fairbridge (Rhodesia and Exeter, 1908), perhaps the most remarkable and certainly the most original of all Rhodes Scholars. As is well known, he founded, chiefly by the power of his own imagination and indomitable enterprise, the Child Emigration Movement, the story of which he has told in his own unique autobiography. Among the deceased are also three Judges, one Attorney General of Western Australia, T. L. Davy (Western Australia and Exeter, 1909) who had rendered unremitting and versatile public service throughout his short life; one Fellow of New College, S. P. McCallum (New Zealand and Hertford, 1920); and scholars of high

reputation in different branches like W. T. Barbour (Michigan and Oriel, 1908), a legal historian of notable promise, A. B. West (Wisconsin and Oriel, 1907), an ancient historian whose eminence (it is permitted to say) would have been signalized by an Honorary Fellowship of his Oxford college if he had not died, E. V. Gordon (British Columbia and University, 1915), Professor of Philology, University of Manchester; and, only recently, Norman Rogers (Nova Scotia and University, 1918), Canadian Minister of Defence at the time of his death, a man of whom high expectations were entertained in Canadian politics and public life.

LEADERS IN EDUCATION

OF the vocations which have been followed by Rhodes Scholars by far the largest single group has been claimed by education either in universities or in schools. This group numbers between 600 and 650, or considerably more than a quarter of the total number. How would Rhodes have regarded this result of his plan? It is not gratifying to all tastes, and the Scholarships are sometimes accused of breeding "a race of schoolmasters" rather than men of action and public influence. There is good reason to think that Rhodes would not have been displeased. While on the one hand he expressed his dislike of "mere bookworms", his whole life, and certainly his will, showed that he had the greatest faith in education, and his phrase "educational relations make the strongest tie" is one of the keynotes of his whole benefaction. It is obvious that in the educational world there are great opportunities for maturing and fulfilling exactly the objects which Rhodes contemplated. At all events Rhodes Scholars have been remarkably successful in this field. Many are recognized as leading authorities in their subjects. No less than 20 are Presidents of Universities and Colleges, and Dr. Frank Aydelotte (Indiana and Brasenose, 1905), a remarkable figure in American education and the dynamic General Secretary of the Rhodes Scholarships in the United States, is Director of the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton, having previously been for many years President of Swarthmore College. A Rhodes Scholar is Dean of the Theological Faculty at Harvard, W. L. Sperry (Michigan and Queen's, 1904); another Master of a House at Harvard, C. H. Haring (Massachusetts and New College, 1907); another Warden of one of the principal colleges of the University of Melbourne, J. C. V. Behan (Victoria and Hertford, 1904), formerly Fellow of University College, Oxford, General Secretary of the Rhodes Scholarships in Australia. There are several Deans of large Medical Schools; several Professors of English provincial universities and the University of London; and at Oxford itself there are the Dean of Christ Church, the Very Rev. John Lowe (Ontario and Christ Church, 1922), three Professors—Brigadier H. W. B. Cairns (South Australia and Balliol, 1917), Nuffield Professor of Surgery; Alfred Ewert (Manitoba and St. John's, 1912), Professor of Romance Languages; and H. W. Florey (South Australia and Magdalen, 1921), Professor of Pathology—together with four Fellows of Colleges, four Fellows of All Souls (one at present missing on active service) and

two Honorary Fellows of their Colleges, Dr. Frank Aydelotte and Marius Barbeau (Quebec and Oriel, 1907).

In school education 14 Rhodes Scholars are headmasters of schools of different sizes. It is interesting to find that in Australia Rhodes Scholars preside over five of the principal public schools.

THE LAW AND THE SCIENCES

THE next largest group, between 400 and 450, is in the law, and here again there is a striking record of professional success. There are 19 Judges, 20 King's Counsel, one Magistrate, one Provincial Attorney General, one Provincial Solicitor General, one Master in Equity, and one recently appointed, at the very early age of 38, Assistant Attorney General for the United States. While these lines were in the press, it was announced that Sir Edmund Herring, to whom reference is made later, had been appointed Chief Justice of Victoria. There are many lawyers in the United States who stand high in their profession, but, by comparison with British Rhodes Scholars, it is difficult to define their status (since the same insignia of rank and distinction are not awarded in the United States as in British territories) except by saying that 94 out of 185 are members of large firms of acknowledged reputation.

It will be seen that education and law have claimed more than half of the Rhodes Scholars, but they are to be found in every walk of life. There are well over 150 in medicine, either teaching or practising. It is a happy coincidence that the two most eminent brain surgeons in England and Canada—Professor H. W. B. Cairns and Dr. Wilder Penfield (New Jersey and Merton, 1914), Director of the Rockefeller Institute for Neurological Research, Montreal—are both Rhodes Scholars. In South Africa Dr. E. H. Cluver (Stellenbosch and Hertford, 1914) is Health Officer for the Union of South Africa and is at present, for war purposes, Director of Pathological Services. There are many others who stand high, in all parts of the world, either as practitioners or as medical researchers, or in some cases as both.

In the field of science, other than the purely academic, the most eminent name is that of Dr. E. P. Hubble (Illinois and Queen's, 1910) of the Mount Wilson Observatory, California, one of the most distinguished astronomers in the English-speaking world. In Australia Sir David Rivett (Victoria and Lincoln, 1907) is Director of the Commonwealth Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, and is engaged on war work of the highest importance. He and three other Rhodes Scholars are Fellows of the Royal Society—Dr. Penfield, Professor Florey and Professor J. C. Eccles (Victoria and Magdalen, 1925).

BUSINESS AND BANKING

THERE is a fairly large group of Rhodes Scholars in business and banking. In one respect the example of Rhodes has not been followed, for the scholarships cannot yet boast a millionaire! Not a few Rhodes Scholars, however, hold very responsible positions in industry, such as the General Manager in Africa of the British South Africa Company, Colonel T. E.

Robins (Pennsylvania and Christ Church, 1904); the Managing Director of the National Trust Company of Canada, J. M. Macdonnell (Ontario and Balliol, 1905), for many years General Secretary of the Rhodes Scholarships in Canada; and the President of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway, C. E. Newton (Massachusetts and Brasenose, 1920), who is at present also Director of Mine Operations for the Federal Government of the United States. Whitney H. Shepardson (New York and Balliol, 1910), besides being Vice-President of the International Railways of Central America, is a well-known writer on international affairs.

Although the number in the Church is comparatively small, it has produced one Canadian Archbishop, L. R. Sherman (New Brunswick and Christ Church, 1909), an American Bishop, Beverley D. Tucker (Virginia and Christ Church, 1905), and the present Dean of Christ Church, Oxford, to whom reference has already been made—the Very Reverend John Lowe, the first Rhodes Scholar to be elected Head of an Oxford House. He was appointed at the early age of 42. In the United States, Rhodes Scholars preside over theological seminaries of national reputation, and a number—among whom may be mentioned the late Theodore C. Hume (U.S.A.-at-Large and New College, 1926)—hold important pastorates in different denominations.

WRITINGS OF RHODES SCHOLARS

THE writings of Rhodes Scholars, especially on learned and technical subjects, are as the sands of the sea. It would be impossible to give even an approximate estimate of the number and quality of all their publications, including volumes and papers contributed to periodicals. A bibliography, compiled in 1932, of the writings of American Rhodes Scholars alone ran to 453 volumes. Of popular writers the best known are perhaps Elmer Davis (Indiana and Queen's, 1910), now Director of the Office of War Information, and Christopher Morley (Maryland and New College, 1910), one of three Rhodes Scholar brothers, the others being Felix Morley (Maryland and New College, 1917), President of Haverford College, and Frank Morley (Maryland and New College, 1919), a well-known publisher for some years in London and now in New York. Perhaps the most widely known book ever published by a Rhodes Scholar is *Union Now*, by Clarence K. Streit (Montana and University, 1918), while the volume entitled *You Can't do Business with Hitler*, by D. P. Miller (Colorado and Lincoln, 1916), had a remarkable vogue in the United States. Of the Rhodes Scholars who have gone into journalism, there are several in America who have wide influence and reputation as columnists and political commentators, such as R. P. Brandt (Missouri and Lincoln, 1918) of the *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, E. K. Lindley (Idaho and Pembroke, 1920) of the *Washington Post*, and E. D. Canham (Maine and Oriel, 1926) of the *Christian Science Monitor*. A comparatively recent Rhodes Scholar, Geoffrey Cox (New Zealand and Oriel, 1932), has been an indefatigable and widely known commentator on practically all the European wars of the past decade, and is now on the staff of

the New Zealand Embassy at Washington. Several of the older American Rhodes Scholars have made reputations as poets, and there are at least three of younger generations whose verse has attracted attention and has raised high expectations; but it is too early to form any final judgment of their quality. At the present time five voices of Rhodes Scholars are constantly heard by millions "on the air"—those of Elmer Davis, E. K. Lindley, Howard K. Smith (Louisiana and Merton, 1937), author of *Last Train from Berlin*, Charles Collingwood (Maryland and New College, 1939) and Farnsworth Fowle (Vermont and Exeter, 1937), Columbia broadcaster from the Italian front. At least one Rhodes Scholar can claim a best seller on a very large scale, having been chiefly responsible for the composition of *Front Line*.

The activities and interests of Rhodes Scholars outside the ordinary professions are so miscellaneous that it is difficult to select names, but no account would be complete without reference to such men as Marius Barbeau, who has made a unique place for himself as an authority on French-Canadian Folk Lore, and the late F. E. Williams (South Australia and Balliol, 1919), the leading ethnologist of New Guinea, who has unhappily been lost in that country during the present war in an aeroplane accident. There are others in positions of responsibility which do not fall into ordinary categories, such as the Secretary of the Guggenheim Foundation, H. A. Moe (U.S.A.-at-Large and Brasenose, 1919), the former Director of the Canadian Broadcasting Company, W. E. Gladstone Murray (Quebec and New College, 1913), and the Secretary to the Delegates of the Clarendon Press, Oxford, K. Sisam (New Zealand and Merton, 1910), who is also, with one other Rhodes Scholar, Professor H. J. Rose (Quebec and Balliol, 1904), Professor of Greek in the University of St. Andrews, a Fellow of the British Academy.

"PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC DUTIES"

DELIBERATELY left to the last is the record of Rhodes Scholars in what Rhodes called "the performance of public duties". What did he mean by that far-reaching expression? The Trustees have always considered that he did not refer solely to politics in the ordinary acceptation, but rather to that sense of responsibility and public spirit which alone can make a man a valuable member of his particular community, and which may be evinced in many different ways and degrees. It is obviously fallacious to judge a man's contribution to public life by mere titles and distinctions. However, for what such honours may be worth, six British Rhodes Scholars have been knighted for public services—a gratifying proportion among the number, certainly not more than about 400, who would be eligible for this honour. One is Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir John Waddington (Bermuda and Merton, 1909), another is Chief Forestry Commissioner in England, Sir Roy Lister Robinson (South Australia and Magdalen, 1905), a former Triple Blue, a third is Inspector General of Forests in India, Sir Herbert Howard (Rhodesia and Exeter, 1908). A substantial number of Rhodes Scholars have entered the Colonial Service, and some are now in the highest positions, while others bid fair to attain them in time. In the Civil Services

at least two Senior Rhodes Scholars in the United States have long held positions of great responsibility—C. D. Mahaffie (Oklahoma and St. John's, 1905) as a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and Stanley K. Hornbeck (Colorado and Christ Church, 1904) as Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State. With the growth of the administration in Washington during the present war the demand for the service of Rhodes Scholars of all generations has been a signal testimony to their reputation. It is impossible to give a constant number, since the personnel frequently changes, but at the moment of writing there are 136 employed either in Washington or in administrative services abroad, while another 15 are engaged actively on post-war problems, and 55 in government employments not specifically ranked as war service. In the diplomatic service of the Dominions are Leif Egeland (Natal and Trinity, 1924), South African Minister to Sweden, and, at Washington, Geoffrey Cox (New Zealand) and A. S. Watt (New South Wales and Oriel, 1921), First Secretary of the Australian Legation. The peace-time Civil Services, though usually considered to be not so highly developed in the United States and the Dominions as in this country, have attracted over 100 Rhodes Scholars, and at the present time a group of them is helping substantially to strengthen the Canadian Civil Service, especially the Department of External Affairs. Eleven Rhodes Scholars are at present members, in different capacities, of the Dominion war administration. The most important positions are held by N. A. Robertson (British Columbia and Balliol, 1923), Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and a member of the Cabinet War Committee; A. D. P. Heeney (Manitoba and St. John's, 1923), Secretary to the Prime Minister and Clerk to the Privy Council; Lt.-Col. H. A. Dyde, M.C. and Bar (Alberta and University, 1917), Secretary of the Defence Council; H. R. L. Henry (Manitoba and Queen's, 1908), Secretary to the Prime Minister; while H. Borden, K.C. (Nova Scotia and Exeter, 1924), was until recently Co-ordinator of Controls and Chairman of the Wartime Industries Control Board.

POLITICIANS

WHETHER or not Rhodes desired or expected political careers for any large number of his foster-sons, politics has always been a difficult avenue for Rhodes Scholars, few of whom have had, on the one hand, the material independence to neglect their means of livelihood, or, on the other hand, the desire to "live on the game". The political record, however, is by no means negligible. J. H. Hofmeyr (South African College School and Balliol, 1910), one of the most brilliant of Rhodes Scholars, is Minister of Education and Finance in South Africa and Deputy Prime Minister in the present Government. Mention has been made of the late Norman Rogers; J. T. Thorson, K.C. (Manitoba and New College, 1910), now a Judge of the Exchequer Court, was until recently Minister of National War Services in Canada, and Mr. Justice R. C. Tredgold, C.M.G. (Rhodesia and Hertford, 1919), was, until appointed to the Bench, Minister of Defence in Southern Rhodesia, having succeeded another Rhodes Scholar, Mr. Justice V. A. Lewis (South

African College School and New College, 1906), in the Rhodesian Cabinet. J. B. McNair, K.C. (New Brunswick and University, 1911), is Premier of New Brunswick; T. A. Campbell, K.C. (Prince Edward Island and Corpus Christi, 1919), is Premier of Prince Edward Island; and H. A. Winter, K.C. (Newfoundland and University, 1907), having been a member of the Legislative Assembly and Speaker, and later a member of the Newfoundland Cabinet, is now a member of the Commission of Government. There are some 10 members of State Legislatures in the United States and the Dominions. In America, after a long dearth of Federal politicians, there are now, all at once, three members of Congress; one of them, J. W. Fulbright (Arkansas and Pembroke, 1925), formerly President of the University of Arkansas, though only recently elected to Congress, has already come into great prominence by his "Fulbright Formula" for a post-war international policy of the United States. The other members of Congress are C. R. Clason (Maine and Christ Church, 1914) and R. Hale (Maine and Trinity, 1910). The Rhodes Trustees will not be satisfied until a Rhodes Scholar is President of the United States!

It is too early to speak of the contribution of Rhodes Scholars to the present war both in the field and in the auxiliary services. It is extremely difficult to maintain accurate records, but at present 561 are known to be in the armed forces, 311 from the Dominions and 250 from the United States; while 223 are employed in a great variety of administrative posts. The highest command in the field was, until his appointment to the Bench, held by Lieut.-General Sir Edmund Herring (Victoria and New College, 1912), K.B.E., K.C., D.S.O., M.C., E.D., Greek M.C., American D.S.C., who has been in command of the Australian forces in New Guinea. In the Royal Air Force the rank of Acting Air Vice-Marshal is held by J. R. Cassidy, C.B.E. (Queensland and Exeter, 1913). Brigadier Sherwood Lett, D.S.O. (British Columbia and Trinity, 1917), is Deputy Chief of the General Staff, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, and the rank of Brigadier is also held by T. T. Waddington (Bermuda and Exeter, 1908) in the British Forces and by H. V. D. Laing (Nova Scotia and University, 1921) in the Canadian Army Overseas. Already 17 Rhodes Scholars have been killed or lost or have died on active service, and 16 are prisoners of war. Twenty-seven decorations have been won up to the present time.

THE "GREAT IDEA" IN OPERATION

SUCH are a few impressions, necessarily brief and inadequate, of the results of the Rhodes Scholarships in forty years, when about a thousand Rhodes Scholars have reached the stage of showing what they are making of their lives. What would the founder have thought of his "great idea" in its operation? It has developed in ways which he could not have foreseen, but he surely would not have been disappointed in it. It is true that a large number of Rhodes Scholars, perhaps the majority, have not become persons of definite eminence; but how could it be otherwise? No system of selection which human ingenuity could devise could ever pick out from a

large number of young students a body of infallible "winners", for the excellent reason that men of true light and leading will always be in a minority in the world. The selection of a Rhodes Scholar, based largely on promise, is always something of a speculation. The Trustees encourage the selectors not to shrink from experiments when they seem appropriate, and they warn their representatives against attempting to find the ready-made "ideal Rhodes Scholar". They desire among their scholars uniformity neither of type nor of opinion. Every shade of belief and outlook which one expects to find in young men is represented among Rhodes Scholars, and no attempt is ever made to impose the slightest censorship of opinion, political or other. The whole object is to let the man of possibilities develop on his own lines under influences which Rhodes believed would help him to realize himself. This is true even in respect of the founder's professed objects of strengthening the solidarity of the Empire and the bonds between the English-speaking nations. There have been nationalists and separatists and isolationists and even Anglophobes among Rhodes Scholars. Yet it is not to be doubted that their collective influence in the main has been in the directions which Rhodes desired, or that as a group, made up of many different types, they count for something in the English-speaking world, and are likely to do so increasingly in the next chapter of history, when the concert of Anglo-Saxon policy must be the mainstay of peace and progress for all civilization. Only a very hasty and superficial critic, ill-acquainted with the facts, would concur in Mrs. Sarah Gertrude Millin's judgment that the Rhodes Scholarships have produced only a breed of "decent fellows". Nobody who has travelled in the United States—to take only one country—could fail to realize the shallowness of that verdict. Rhodes set a term of a thousand years to his "great idea". He had faith, and his faith is being justified of works—but that is a process which is seldom fulfilled by instantaneous miracles.

STRATEGY OF THE WAR. XVIII

PROSPECTS FOR 1944

WILL 1944 be an *annus mirabilis*? It will certainly—sooner or later, and probably rather later than sooner—be the year of the “grand assault” when the uninterrupted offensive of the Russians will be complemented by Anglo-American blows at many other points of the European perimeter. That was settled at the Teheran Conference, where for the first time the strategy of the United Nations was co-ordinated to the apparent satisfaction of them all. But whether this concentric assault will succeed quickly enough to finish off the German war this year is more doubtful. The fact that the commanders of the Anglo-American invasion forces were not appointed until December should be sufficient warning that the final phase of the war may not be started so soon as too many headlines in the press suggest.

Let us consider for a moment the strategic considerations governing invasion plans, in the light of the incomparably better atmosphere created at Teheran. It has already been argued in this review that, other things being equal, it would be better for an invasion to be a final, overwhelming blow rather than a process of inching forward against a retreating but unbroken enemy. It is essential, if possible, to prevent the Germans devastating Europe, as they could and would do during a slow retreat. Two circumstances alone would require the launching of an invasion before it was fully prepared. The first would be if the Russian armies were in any serious predicament. That now seems impossible. The second would be if the preparations of the Germans to defend became faster and more formidable than the preparations of the Anglo-Americans to attack. On this point the German bluster about the strength of the Atlantic wall may be largely discounted. Materially speaking the coastal defences are probably already as strong as they can ever be made. The Germans do not reckon that they will be impregnable. They rely for the defeat of invasion upon a strong and highly mobile reserve to throw back into the sea any invaders who succeed in effecting a landing. The tactics are the same as those which were employed and very nearly succeeded at Salerno, but much more completely planned and manned. The Germans also rely upon being able seriously to harass the invasion forces before they land. That is why they are deliberately conserving their air force on all fronts, and it may also be at the back of their vague and menacing talk of “secret weapons”—rocket guns, pilotless planes and so on. It would be much too bold to assert that they have no reserve defences of these kinds up their sleeve, but on balance it does not seem likely that anything dictates a premature invasion designed to destroy any relatively faster growth in the German defences.

INVASION NO PICNIC

THERE is indisputable evidence that an invasion, however fully prepared, will be no picnic. The last instalment of this review pointed out the instantaneous and successful German reaction to operations in the Aegean which were conceived on the picnic principle. The extremely slow progress of the Allies in Italy is another instance of the difficulty of keeping even a well-mounted invasion going against a stiff defence in hilly country and atrocious weather; and the campaign in Italy has been a small-scale affair compared with what may be expected elsewhere. It is quite unlikely that facile talk about the German Army "cracking" will prove to be well founded. Why should they crack? They are still well fed, well equipped and thoroughly infected with Nazi theories; and they have nothing whatever to hope for from surrender. There is just a chance of a voluntary German evacuation of occupied territories in order to economize on strength, but this also is most improbable. Lastly, there is a theory that the Germans may actually invite occupation by the Anglo-Americans in order to save themselves from prior conquest by the Russians. This seems the flimsiest of all foundations on which to build the hope that invasion will be easy.

The German defence in the west will therefore be stubborn; but it cannot succeed if the invasion is properly planned and mounted. The past three months have seen a quick decline in the German military strength, not so much absolutely as relatively to the Allied strength, and against a concentric offensive it can hold somewhere but not everywhere. The Germans are neither so strong nor so mobile as they pretend to be, and their strategy is now based on a retreat slow enough and costly enough to the Allies to induce the latter to make some peace short of unconditional surrender.

ALLIES' BOMBING STRATEGY

THIS decline in relative strength is due to two main causes—enormous losses in Russia and enormous damage to war industries inflicted by the Allied bombing offensive. The relative contribution of the two cannot be assessed until after the war, because aerial photographs cannot tell the whole story; but then it will probably be found that the contribution of bombing is quite great enough to justify ranking it with the contribution of the Russian offensives. There have been no generically new developments in bombing strategy, but it has been much heavier and it has produced new results. For example, in the six weeks beginning on November 18, 14,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Berlin alone during the R.A.F. night raids; and on January 11 over 700 heavy American bombers attacked aircraft factories in central Germany by day. The ratio of casualties to numbers of aircraft engaged has actually declined by night. By day it has sometimes been light, sometimes heavy. For example, in the big attack on January 11, the loss among the heavy bombers was about 8 per cent, which would be too high an average and is in fact higher than the average. But there is neither a case nor a cause for confining the offensive to the hours of darkness. Two new

tactical developments promise to preserve that continuity of bombing, which is a strategic necessity. The first is the increasing use of long-range fighters to cover the day bombers. The second is the successful technique of precision bombing through cloud. A more remote future promises yet another guarantee of successful bombing, namely the jet-propelled fighter with a speed and range far beyond anything so far in operational service.

Moreover air casualties cannot be fairly assessed without reference to the results achieved and the defences encountered. Taking again the example of January 11, a loss of 59 heavy bombers means a loss of, say, 800 men at the outside. Against this must be set enemy losses of over 150 fighters, without counting ground casualties, and of three vital aircraft factories. Of course air crews are picked men, and the loss of any man, picked or not picked, is not to be lightly dismissed. But compared with the losses incurred for much lesser objectives in other wars and in other ways, the cost is extremely light. It is also surprisingly light in view of the enemy's defences. The bomber offensive has forced him to concentrate upon fighter production. That in itself preserves Allied peoples and armies from enemy bombing on any large scale. It means that he disposes of great forces of fighters for defence both by day and by night. He shows every sign of wishing to conserve these forces for the moment of invasion—he sends up practically nothing to protect targets in occupied territory and not even very much over satellite territory (with the exception of the vital Ploesti oilfields). But he fills the sky with machines when Germany is attacked, turns night into day with flares, and attacks Allied bombers both by day and by night all the way from the coast to the target and back. It seems pretty clear from the small results of all this effort, that defence is the wrong end of the strategic stick in air warfare and that Lord Baldwin was not far wrong when he said in the now dim past "the bomber will always get through".

Casualties and the bombing of production centres have also greatly limited the increase in his fighter strength. It will not be enough to cover Germany, let alone vital targets outside Germany, when the bombing offensive develops further, as it will do in two ways. At the New Year the Russian lines were 400 miles nearer England than they were last spring, and first-rate airfields in Italy had been repaired and developed. This opens up the possibility of a bombing shuttle service from England to Russia and England to Italy and back again. Alternatively or simultaneously the Italian airfields expose south Germany, Austria and the Balkans at reasonably short range to heavy bombers based on Italy. Heavy raids on objectives in these countries were increasingly frequent throughout the turn of the year, to the notable dismay of the Bulgarians and the joy of the Yugoslav patriots.

EVENTS IN ITALY

THE development of air-pressure from the south and south-east is indeed evidence that the securing of suitable airfields was the primary purpose of the invasion of Italy. But there are other reasons why the land advance there has been so slow. If the writer may be forgiven a personal reminiscence, he knows from the experience of several years exactly what an Italian winter in

the Apennines can be like; and has always doubted the story that Hannibal's troops were enervated by the warmth of wintering in Capua. If it is true, the climate must have changed. On the other hand he finds it very easy to believe that the rain and mud are quite as bad as at Passchendaele. Apart from the climate, the possible routes of advance are strictly limited. From the line across Italy from the mouth of the Garigliano to Ortona, there are three ways of reaching Rome. The first is by the Via Appia across the coastal plain. This has been flooded by the Germans, who have undone Mussolini's work as well as Mussolini. The second is up the Sacco valley through Cassino and Frosinone. Believe it or not, this is the only practicable winter way. For the third and last is up the east coast to Pescara and then south-west across the Apennines by passes blocked with snow or, if clear, too easily defensible. In these conditions, there are only two chances of something better than "inching forward". One is when the Fifth Army breaks through to Cassino and reaches the easier country beyond. The other would be a new sea-borne landing. This latter means of making a real bound forward was chosen by General Alexander on January 22, when a flanking force was sent by sea to make a surprise landing at beaches near the little port of Nettuno 30 miles south of Rome. The operation was a complete surprise, and the landing practically unopposed, but it failed to achieve its strategic object of cutting the German communications and compelling a retirement from the Garigliano-Rapido front. The landing forces refrained from attempting any swift and deep penetration inland, and by the time they had built up sufficient strength for a formal assault, the enemy had collected enough troops from north and south to repel them without substantially weakening his hold on the main front further south. The public, which has little idea how ferocious and bloody this Italian fighting has been, have been disproportionately disappointed. They draw irrelevant contrasts with the course of the campaign in Russia and form irrelevant views about the prospects of a second front.

Far too much attention is paid in this country to events in Italy. When Italy is only one of several land fronts, it will be easier to realize that the Italian campaign is, strategically speaking, a side-show. This verdict tastes slightly of sour grapes, because it may originally have been intended and was expected to be something more; but for some months there has been every symptom that a side-show it is—quite useful in battering 12 picked German divisions and containing in northern Italy perhaps as many more, quite essential for the possession of strategic airfields, but not the main blow. So far it has not even been made the anteroom for a serious Allied attack across the Adriatic, where the Yugoslav patriots are conducting another fascinating side-show, and absorbing perhaps another 10 German divisions. Again it happens that the writer has traversed this country from end to end on foot, and can therefore assert with confidence that the Germans will never suppress the patriots. Nor will the patriots drive out the Germans unless and until their campaign becomes part of a fully equipped Allied offensive, on the model of that by which Wellington, with the help of Spanish guerrillas, drove the French out of Spain. It is no part of a strategic

review to analyse the deplorable antagonism between the forces of Marshal Tito and General Mihailovitch, who are adding a civil to a national war. The fact remains that, in spite of this distraction, Marshal Tito is giving the Germans great trouble and is receiving as much as possible of Allied air support and supplies. Yugoslavia, like Spain from 1808 onwards, is a running sore upon the enemy's body.

THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE

It is now time to turn to the second and the deeper of the two deep wounds inflicted on his military strength. Two and a half years ago Hitler proclaimed that the Russian armies had ceased to exist as a coherent and controlled military force. During the past nine months these armies have driven his armies back for an average of about 400 miles on a 1,000-mile front, and have recovered all but a fraction of Russian territory as it existed before September 1939. The features of this sustained offensive have been precisely that coherence which Hitler claimed to have destroyed, the masses of highly trained men and modern material produced and maintained, in spite of the huge losses of 1941-42 and the complete wrecking of always imperfect communications by the retreating Germans. Looking back in retrospect over the course of the Eastern campaigns (which were expected by all without first-hand knowledge of Russia to end in a swift and complete German victory), the most astonishing of many astonishing things is not the valour of the Russian armies but their technical skill, not improvisation with inadequate or obsolete resources but the pondered use of abundant and first-class material. Perhaps a third miracle may be added, namely, the completely false estimate of Russian strength and resources made by the German High Command, in spite of the fact that between the two wars many German soldiers studied and trained in Russia. *Quem Deus vult perdere, dementat prius.*

To pass to the principles of Russian strategy, the chief has been the "staggered offensive". This means the launching in succession of really heavy blows at widely separated but closely correlated points. This strategy involves very great confidence in the troops, because it means that they are not substantially reinforced to meet the inevitable and sometimes very heavy German counter-attacks, but have to hold on while other blows are being prepared. For example, a big offensive west of Kiev in November pushed out a big bulge to Zhitomir and Korosten. It was violently counter-attacked for a whole month, and sometimes looked like being driven in. But the defending infantry does not appear to have been seriously reinforced except by mobile artillery and mine-laying engineers. The bulk of the Russian reserves were quietly collected, and when the counter-attack was spent launched three new separate offensives, one far to the north towards Vitebsk, one in extension of the northern side of the bulge along the south flank of the Pripet marshes, and one from the south side of the bulge across the neck of the Dnieper bend.

The Russian strategy of "staggered offensives" has been greatly helped by the foolish obstinacy with which the Germans have held on to enormous

and worthless salients. This tenacity is in flagrant contradiction of the enemy's professed strategy of controlled retreat and economy of men. It is so idiotic in the military sense that rumour attributes it to Hitler's own intuition over-riding the common sense of the German General Staff; and certainly wherever a German formation is over-run it is found to have received a personal order from Hitler to hold on to the last. When tactics conflict with strategy, the result is usually expensive. Hanging on to salients has kept military observers on tenterhooks ever since Stalingrad, waiting and watching for more Stalingrads. Until the first week in February they were disappointed. The Germans generally managed to pull out their main forces just in time to prevent encirclement of anything but small bodies, though not to prevent heavy casualties—for example, at the fall of Kirovograd in mid-January they lost eight divisions. Moreover, hanging on outside Leningrad too long also cost them heavily, and the retreat, when it came, had to be a rush right back to the Estonian frontier with the loss of all heavy siege artillery. Nevertheless major disaster was avoided until the first week in February. Then the Russians by a converging attack cut off the tip of the Cherkassy salient on the middle Dnieper with ten divisions left behind in it; and the Germans, who had exhausted themselves in vain counter-attacks earlier, were unable to launch a relief offensive in sufficient strength to break the ring. A few days later another converging attack on the south flank of the Dnieper bend cut off five more divisions east of Nikopol. These were real disasters for the Germans. That at Cherkassy was incurred for no purpose whatever. The salient was quite useless for any purpose except an offensive which the Germans were clearly neither designing nor able to launch. The Nikopol disaster may have been due to the need for hanging on as long as possible to the manganese deposits of which the town is the centre. Probably these deposits are essential for the German steel industry to produce enough to make good losses in material. But the enemy could not have hoped to hold this salient indefinitely and there is no excuse for throwing away five divisions with it.

The incapacity of the enemy to stage any effective come-back at any part of this vast front is perhaps the best comment upon the incredulity with which Russian claims used to be received. The enemy's impotence is due to shortage of men and material; and this can only mean that the Russian claims have consistently been accurate. If so, the German casualties on all fronts are already about $2\frac{1}{2}$ times the total for the war of 1914-18. Embarrassment on the battle-fronts would have shown itself long ago but for the fact that the Germans have made far greater use of foreign labour on the home front and thus released more Germans for the Army. Nevertheless losses on this scale mean that total defeat can at best only be delayed. The spate of gloomy warnings poured out on the German people by Goebbels are in fact far too optimistic. More than retreat, large but orderly, is in prospect. The whole strategy of defence, which was substituted for the *Blitzkrieg* at the end of 1942, is collapsing; and it must be repeated that the enemy can hold against the "grand assault" somewhere but not everywhere.

With the political repercussions of these Russian offensives this review

cannot concern itself. There are, however, some more distant military repercussions which must be mentioned. In the first place such alarm and death-bed repentance have been aroused in the satellite countries of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria that they have become a definite military liability for Germany. This change has been helped by the heavy Allied bombing of Sofia, which will undoubtedly be followed by the bombing of Rumanian and Hungarian targets. In the second place the Russian advance in the centre will certainly be helped by active Polish co-operation now that the Russian armies have reached pre-war Polish territory and are approaching indisputably Polish territory. Lastly the advance has induced the Germans to indulge in such barbarities during their retreat that they can hope for no respite whatever from the Russian armies, nor for any result whatever from any attempts to use the diplomatic arm to avert or mitigate the consequences of military defeat.

THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST

So much for the German war. Progress in the Japanese war has been less sensational, but most promising, and a very definite strategy is evolving for the Allied counter-offensive which began a year ago with the American landing on Guadalcanal and the Australian victories in Papua. It will be recalled that when the Japanese flood reached high tide, three objectives, all luscious, appeared open to the Japanese High Command. These were the invasion of India, the liquidation of China and the invasion of Australia. The choice actually made is not yet very clear; but it seems likely that Australia was in fact selected. The great Japanese naval forces at one time in the Bay of Bengal seem to have been switched to the Pacific and joined to a large force of troop transports. This expedition was so thoroughly broken up in the Battle of the Coral Sea that the projected landings at Port Moresby and/or in Queensland failed to materialize; and the Battle of Midway rubbed in the conclusion that Allied sea and air power had become too strong to mount a further offensive at the end of a 3,000-mile supply line. The Japanese were definitely thrown upon the defensive in the Pacific. They have conducted it with a stubborn tenacity witnessed by the fact that in all the fighting up to the end of 1943 the Americans took only 377 prisoners. This is no measure of the enemy's total losses. About 16,000 dead were counted in the Australian reconquest of Papua alone, the Americans counted 2,400 dead in the first three weeks after their landing at Cape Gloucester, and the dead in the Battle of Midway are estimated at 20,000. Nor has a tenacious defence prevented the loss of considerable territory. After clearing Papua, with the help of an American division transported from Australia wholly by air, the Australians have advanced into New Guinea. They have taken the two important bases of Lae and Salamaua, have cleared the Huon peninsula, and are pushing up the coast to join strong American forces landed at Saidor. The main American forces, after their exploits in the Solomons, have landed in New Britain, with the ultimate purpose of ejecting the Japanese from their big, much-pounded base at Rabaul. The American seizure of Cape Gloucester secures

both sides of the straits between New Guinea and New Britain. In the first week of February further large American forces assaulted the Marshall Islands, which the Japanese have been fortifying for 10 years. The Americans were after more than the sentimental satisfaction of capturing Japanese territory. They have secured a most threatening position on the flank of the whole of the enemy's Pacific communications. The significant feature of this operation is that the Japanese Navy did not attempt any major interference but confessed frankly that American air power was too strong to risk ships without air cover. This is absolutely convincing evidence that the Battle of Midway played havoc with their carriers, and there has been nothing more encouraging since the war began. Allied air superiority seems continuous and universal. It is not to be expected that the Japanese will go back as fast as they advanced. Anything better than negligible forces would have made their advance then as slow as ours is now. But the initiative has changed hands completely. If the Japanese did choose Australia as their next major objective, they chose wrong.

Meanwhile sporadic operations in China have not materially changed the situation there. It really seems as though the size of the country prevents the Japanese from concentrating any overwhelming forces at any point. One of the blackest of many black features in the autumn of 1942 was the possibility that China would be knocked out; and the need for raising the siege was the only strong strategic argument against the decision to finish off the German war first. The danger becomes less with every German defeat and every Japanese recoil elsewhere.

A Japanese recoil from Burma would naturally be the most reassuring. Except for a very great increase in Allied air activity, fruitful local operations by American-trained Chinese troops, and the recapture of Maungdaw early in January, there have been no outward signs of an offensive by the South East Asia Command. The reconquest of Burma is probably the biggest tactical problem presented in any theatre of war, and its solution will take time to mature. Any really large-scale offensive in these regions is not to be expected soon.

To return to the question with which this article started, namely, will 1944 be an *annus mirabilis*, the chances are that—in the West—it will. The past four years have shown that if peace-time policy is such as to make it certain that, in the event of war, we have no tenable bridgehead in Europe, then extraordinary exertions will be required to create one. Those exertions have been forthcoming, and, thanks to the entry of Russia and the United States into the war, they seem likely to mature after only four years.

ELECTION YEAR IN AMERICA

WAR, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

THE situation on the American home front, with all its deficiencies, is strong and sound as the hour of decision approaches in Europe. We have strikes—but only a microscopic relative total of man-hours of production have been lost by them. We have political arguments—but our leadership on world affairs is able and vigorous. We have soft spots in the popular morale, such as grumbling at rationing and cheating over gasoline—but not the slightest hint of drawing back from any degree of sacrifice in the task that lies ahead.

We, who live with, and report for, the press the many turns and twists of American political and economic life, are always inclined to see the trees instead of the forest. Is it not enough to say that, despite warnings of potentially large American casualties when the invasion comes, the people have not wavered at all, but have rallied unswervingly around our military leadership and their decisions? Is it not enough to recall that, despite certain difficulties, our war production has far exceeded in nearly all lines every mark that was set for it in advance? And do not our forces, from Generals and Admirals down to private soldiers and seamen, give adequate accounts of themselves when their hour of action comes?

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

BUT, if our Allies can count without reservation on the American people to-day, what of the future? First, as stated above, there is no trace of wavering or weariness to be seen. There is no discernible movement for a separate peace or an early peace or any kind of peace except that based on unconditional surrender, as set forth by our leaders. Criticism of our Allies, which at times has seemed a potential danger, has been lessening. Particularly is this true of our relations with Russia, and it applies surprisingly to political as well as to military affairs. Admiration for the feats at arms of the Soviet Union is to be expected. Less certain was the attitude of Americans toward Russia's territorial claims. One would have said that the large numbers of Poles, Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians and Finns in the United States would have produced great group hostility to Russia's plans for frontier revision. But, although the last chapter has not been reached, American press and public opinion so far has been notably tolerant and sympathetic toward the Russian claims.

It was expected that many influences here, particularly those connected with the Roman Catholic Church with its interest in Poland, would have raised a considerable propaganda outcry as the Russian armies penetrated into old Polish territory. These same influences have long been vigorously anti-Communist, and some of them—like the "Christian Front" group—were pro-Nazi, but their comments on the Polish situation have been very

restrained. While another song will doubtless be sung if and as a post-war opportunity comes to revise this boundary situation, the degree of restraint which prevails to-day is an unexpected relief. Vast changes, indeed, have come over our relations with the Soviet Union, and we are following the same course as public opinion in Britain, though with a time-lag. The views about Russia now expressed by our most responsible—and occasionally conservative—public men would have been considered dangerously pro-Bolshevik two or three years ago. Thus it is that the basis for post-war confidence and co-operation is being laid. There is nothing but praise, in responsible American circles, for the results of Secretary Hull's trip to Moscow or President Roosevelt's journey to Teheran. Our lend-lease shipments to Russia are a tangible proof of American policy, since they totalled \$3,550 million from March 1941 to October 1943, 25.6 per cent of our total lend-lease exports. American admiration for Russian deeds and this concrete support of the Russian arms should go far to soften the natural suspicion with which Moscow has often regarded the United States. A steady groundwork of good-will is being created, Americans hope, which should pay dividends after the fighting is over. The signs are set, therefore, for improved American-Russian relations right along.

ANGLO-AMERICAN CONTACTS

WHAT of prospective relations with Britain? There the situation is not easy to describe confidently. The deep admiration and respect which Americans felt for Britain's achievements in the darker days of the war is still a fact. Presumably a great many service men in Britain are reflecting a real liking and understanding for their hosts there, and will return better Anglo-Americans. Yet there remains a great deal of work to be done by thoughtful Americans and British before it can be said that our post-war relations are on the right track. The story of Britain's commitments and operations everywhere in the war at present, when it is frankly forecast that a larger proportion of American than British troops will be involved in the Channel operation, has not been explained to the public. There is danger that many Americans will fail to understand this proportion. Two acute points of Anglo-American contact, undoubtedly, will be in the world air and sea lanes. There may well also be rivalry commercially in South America and the Far East. The basic accusation made when most Americans start talking critically about Britain is that British policy is calculatingly self-centred, with a long eye to the future and a willingness to sacrifice Allied interests for advantage. India and the dependent parts of the British Empire are the most notable propaganda targets here. When Hong Kong and Singapore once more enter the discussion, they will certainly cause difficulty unless Britain's contribution to the war against Japan has been great enough to persuade Americans that she has won back her place in the Orient. Our tolerance toward Russia's territorial position could be repeated in the case of Britain in the East—if Britain is a vigorous enough participant in the Asiatic war.

Nevertheless Anglo-American relations can stand a great deal of improve-

ment on this side of the Atlantic, and will possibly need more attention with every passing month. Nearly everything will depend on events and deeds in the war, and how accurately these are set before the American public. There is, of course, a tendency for American war correspondents to tell little except the feats of their fellow citizens, and this produces a very unbalanced picture, as in North Africa and Italy. But the truth gradually gets known. It would be a mistake for Britain to undertake a new publicity campaign in the United States, but the best possible effects would follow if Americans now in Britain became realistic, friendly and accurate observers of British policy and achievements now and as promised in the months and years ahead, and conveyed their impressions to the people back home.

Remarkable co-operation prevails between American and British political and military leaders. Relations between President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill need no comment. The harmony of the Allied Chiefs of Staff in Washington is equally notable. And even more salutary is the co-operation of the men in the field. General Eisenhower has made a great contribution to this good result, and doubtless will make many more in the near future. In Washington the story is told that when Sir Hastings Ismay visited him and asked, off-hand, the nationality of another officer on the staff, General Eisenhower had to scratch his head and search his memory before he recalled whether the individual was British or American. If the story is true, we are certainly making progress in the field of military co-operation. And what is done there is bound to be reflected on the home side, sooner or later.

THE SMALLER NATIONS

ANOTHER problem relating to Britain, America, Russia and the post-war situation is troubling many Americans. The Big Three, they feel, are becoming more and more heedless of the rights and hopes of the lesser members of the United Nations. They believe that the arbitrament of world affairs must be genuinely broadened as rapidly as possible. There have been many suggestions here—including vigorous proposals by such men as Sumner Welles and Wendell Willkie—for the immediate formation of a United Nations Council. Related to concern over the monopolistic position of the Big Three is the lurking fear that peace in Europe, whenever it comes, may find us all seriously unprepared. Our experiences in North Africa and Italy do not seem at all encouraging. The confusion of policies that has prevailed toward Yugoslavia, Greece and France raises most disquieting questions. There is no sign that Washington has thought through, or begun to think through, a German policy. Again there is the fear that President Roosevelt is counting on feeling his way, and from 3,000 miles away British policy looks almost as unclear. We, too, have many German refugees and among them there is a large percentage of Pan-Germans, however "democratic" their background. In addition, there are many others whose influence will all be on the side of a "soft" peace toward the Reich. The American people as a whole have shown no sympathy with this view. They realize deeply the need of making the German nation and people realize their total defeat. They appreciate the mistake of 1918. But their good intentions are at the

mercy of bungling, improvisation and chicanery. It is, of course, obvious that the shrewdest Germans must already be at work on the task of winning the next peace, and their most hopeful fields of operation are in Britain and the United States. And their greatest ally is present unpreparedness for peace, absence of clear policies. This weak spot in our war plans—for, of course, the post-war settlement is genuinely and decisively a part of the war effort—will be made worse by the inevitability of some sort of a let-down in the United States when the war with Germany is over. Such a let-down will also damage our action in the tough war in the Pacific that will still be on our hands, and the Pacific war will take our attention undesirably from the European post-war problem. All of which emphasizes the great desirability of post-war planning now, beyond the debating society and women's club stage, and in the highest Allied councils.

CANDIDATES FOR THE PRESIDENCY

WE have also entered the year of a Presidential election. The regrettable necessity of this ordeal arises from our rigid, written Constitution, and there is nothing that can be done about it. Whether or not the campaign damages our internal unity and our position in the eyes of our friends abroad, will depend largely on the events of the war itself. If by midsummer and early autumn things are going rather slowly in the war against Germany—if we are still struggling in the Low Countries or their equivalent—and if, as would be certain, the restrictions and dislocations of the United States home front are bearing heavily on people, their dissatisfaction with President Roosevelt would certainly be reflected at the polls. On the other hand—and this observation will seem inconsistent—if the war were in a genuinely grave state by autumn, the voters might think a change entirely too risky. And, alternatively, if Germany is on the verge of defeat or actually collapsed, the country might either feel grateful and satisfied toward President Roosevelt or relieved enough to risk a change! It is necessary to include these four conflicting possibilities, because events may direct public opinion into any one of these four channels. But the best guess in early January was that President Roosevelt would be re-elected. Late last year the tides of reaction were running against him, and his position in Congress was precarious. But that was an inevitable period of weariness and squabbling, and among the President's most damaging opponents were many Southern Democrats. They could afford to be in opposition at a time when there was no election. But this year they will have to choose between definitely deserting their chief or supporting his re-nomination. The latter alternative is the only possible choice for all except the most extreme among them. Nomination of any other Democratic candidate, assuming Mr. Roosevelt to be available, would lead to certain defeat.

Among the Republicans, confidence in a wave of reaction against the present Administration is blended with confusion about the candidates. The professional Republican politicians are for the most part engaged in sniping at Wendell Willkie, who has succeeded in offending most of them in one way or another, either by independence and honesty or by tactlessness and

impetuosity. Yet Mr. Willkie remains in many ways the ablest potential Republican candidate—bold, impressive, dynamic, and with at least a modicum of world acquaintance and experience. The Republican politicians distinctly prefer Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, who almost got the nomination in 1940 and has had over a year of sound experience in state administration subsequently. Governor Dewey is a confident and aggressive man, carrying his youthfully assured manner almost to a fault, and he has had no experience at all in world affairs. Yet he has been visibly maturing since he ran for the nomination four years ago, and when recently he advocated an Anglo-American alliance he showed his boldness and realism in world politics. The other Republican hopefuls are rather far in the rear. Governor John W. Bricker of Ohio, a forthright isolationist and conservative, has made no headway. There are several "unknowns" who might be nominated if the Republican Convention were deadlocked between stronger candidates. And there is a steady boom for General Douglas MacArthur, also in isolationist and conservative circles. It seems scarcely possible that General MacArthur would inject the conduct of the war deeply into politics by consenting to be the candidate; but his personal views have not been stated, and his supporters are zealous, active propagandists. It is known that General MacArthur resents the decisions which have limited the support his command has received, and some of his communiqués and statements made by his own staff pointedly resemble a build-up. Yet, even so, his candidature would be a surprise.

The tumult of a political campaign is a hard thing to contemplate at the crucial moment in a global war. Yet, after all, President Roosevelt has been strafed and dive-bombed by his political opponents during four and a half years of world war already, and latterly it has been by his own party as much as by the Republicans. The transition to a campaign year will therefore not be as sharp as might be expected. Also, the actual campaigning should be kept brief and confined largely to domestic issues. If conduct of the war becomes a political football, the most distressing consequences would arise, creating great difficulties for the President. There are, of course, many controversial points that can be brought to light in the examination of any war planning. If General MacArthur were the Republican candidate the dangers of mixing war and politics would be particularly acute. The President, as heretofore, will probably gain political advantage by keeping the mantle of his office close about him and behaving like a Chief Executive rather than like an aspirant. His greatest political strength, of course, will be his conduct of the war and the need for an experienced hand in the near future. By emphasizing these factors, he might be able to leave his opponent hammering away at domestic issues which may or may not be impelling in the people's view. In any case such a situation need not necessarily disrupt the United States war effort. It could, indeed, clear the air, and we must assume the patriotic and responsible co-operation of the rival candidates to handle the situation constructively from nomination to election and thereafter. Thus 1944 will be a test of our political good sense, maturity and responsibility.

STRIKES AND INFLATION

THE home front, non-politically speaking, is far from stable—but we are producing the goods even so. The anomalies which prevail here are partly the result of our physical isolation from the war, and partly the consequence of being a continental State with de-centralized government and many difficulties in controlling economic conditions. Our gravest problem is not strikes, but the threat of runaway inflation, which of course could damage the whole world. Prices have threatened constantly to break from the untrustworthy bonds in which the Administration has sought to keep them. There has already been about a 30-point rise in the cost of living since 1939. Unless subsidies are voted by Congress, there is the likelihood that farm prices will go much higher. That, in turn, will provide added leverage for labor in getting higher wages, and the vicious circle is formed. However the break has not yet come. The inflation dam stands, although a great deal of water has escaped through its gaps. Doubtless the greatest single inflationary result has been a tremendous decline in quality of merchandise, food-stuffs and other necessities. Thus, beyond price variations, lies a big field of quality decline, which in many lines must equal almost a 50 per cent rise in prices. Congress still refuses to vote big enough taxes to drain down the larger pools of inflation money. Taxes are high indeed on upper and middle brackets; but they strike only moderately at the new war workers or all the lower incomes where most of the new money finds its way. As a result, along with much gratifying purchase of goods that poor people have wanted for a long time, there has been a great deal of irrational and reckless spending. Happily much of this is in the field of non-essentials, like fur coats and jewellery, and hence does not so greatly affect the basic cost of living. Nevertheless the new money remains an inflation threat unless drawn off by some additional means. War bonds, of course, provide one useful outlet, and there has been an unexpected amount of saving in other ways.

Strikes are directly connected with the cost of living and the threat of inflation. The "little steel formula", by which wages were not to go up more than 15 per cent over what was earned on January 1, 1941, has now been broken several times, most notably as a result of John L. Lewis's coal strike. That stoppage was the most serious of all our labor troubles, and is resulting in a serious fuel shortage along the Atlantic seaboard. But apart from the coal strike, the other labor disturbances have not yet led to great national consequences. They have had powerful psychological repercussions, and the steel and rail strike threats are not yet finally settled, but work has not stopped for more than a few hours in the steel mills, and on the railroads not at all. Indeed the rail situation had a grimly humorous aspect when William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, announced after the Government had been forced to take over the lines that of course they would not have gone out on strike anyway.

Such statements are steadily creating serious public impatience with the unions. Men in service, according to much evidence, are thoroughly

aroused at strikes and threats of strikes among workers being paid much more than men in uniform for remaining at home. Labor leaders also realize that, when the war boom is over, unless it is succeeded by a tremendous peace boom, their chance of obtaining great concessions and increased wages will be greatly diminished. Looking at the matter selfishly, labor has to catch the boat now—or not at all. And when labor sees the statistics of vast industrial profits, even after taxation, the working man honestly feels he is not getting his share. There are other, and unobserved, ways in which management can “strike”, by declining contracts until it gets a desired price, or concessions regarding conversion to post-war uses. Labor knows these things, and feels that it is badly understood to-day. One striking symbol of labor’s discontent is shown in a list of 100 war contracts just made public by a group of Senators in defence of the re-negotiation clauses of the tax law. These clauses permitted the Army and Navy to re-calculate contracts after they had been in operation long enough to show just what profits were being made. The vital necessity of re-negotiation is shown in some of the cases. One company made profits of $8\frac{1}{4}$ million dollars, after taxes, which was four times as much as in any pre-war year. Another company—which makes “elastic stop nuts”—made \$3,480,000 in 1942 as compared with \$432,000 in its best pre-war year. Its 1942 profit was 122 per cent of the company’s net worth. Another company made 96½ per cent of its net worth in 1942, a profit 13 times as great as in its biggest pre-war year. Such figures, which would be reduced under the re-negotiation law, are but an indication of the war profits that are being made in the United States, after taxes. And even after re-negotiation, substantial profits are left in many cases. It is no wonder that labor, though under a no-strike pledge, becomes restive and seeks a share. And yet work stoppage is next door to treason in war-time, and is so regarded by many men in service.

THE WAR WITHIN

AMERICA’S problem comes back to the need for citizens—employer, worker, housewife—to realize the one-ness of the war, all the way from the bomber or destroyer or slit-trench to the factory and counting-house and home. Our nation has not yet adequately realized that fact, and so it has not yet won its war within. When that realization comes, and perhaps it will come through the hard experiences of coming months in the European fighting, we will be on our way to winning the war elsewhere, and will start our preparation for winning the peace. Many Americans indeed have won their war within already. This is particularly true of those who are in the service, or who have come actively up against the real and sobering problems of the war. The question Americans have to answer is: How can we bring to all the people the spiritual victory which has been won by those who have seen things straight?

United States of America,
January 1944.

INDIA

LORD WAVELL'S FIRST MONTHS

LORD WAVELL was installed as Viceroy on October 20. He at once threw himself with vigour and determination into his Government's campaign on the economic front, and made quick gains of both material and moral value. He also showed a keen interest in post-war reconstruction which has been reflected in the quickening tempo of planning. On the political front there was no development requiring the attention of the Viceroy, and Lord Wavell has let sleeping dogs lie.

As a General, Lord Wavell is accustomed to visit his armies in the field and, having seen the situation for himself, to make an immediate decision. He preferred to discuss operations with his commanders face to face rather than to issue written directions. These methods are subject to some limitations, both constitutional and practical, in the field of civil administration, but it is Lord Wavell's intention to pursue them as far as possible. He has already been to Bengal (twice), to the Punjab, the North-West Frontier, Assam, and Orissa. At the time of writing he is in the United Provinces, whence he is going on to Bombay and, it is anticipated, will have visited all the Provinces of British India before the cold weather ends. In Bengal, his first visit towards the end of October is memorable not only for the decision to throw the army into the fight against the famine, but also for the conscientious way in which he and Lady Wavell investigated conditions which, in the worst affected areas of the Province, were such as to turn any visitor physically sick. The Bengalis in their misery acclaimed Lord Wavell as a man of heart as well as action. In the Punjab Lord Wavell succeeded in persuading the Provincial Government to accept as a matter of patriotic duty the all-India food policy which they had in part rejected as being contrary to the interests of the Province. For the rest, Lord Wavell's tours were valuable for the purpose of obtaining first-hand information on provincial problems. He supplemented these by holding a Conference of Provincial Governors late in November in Delhi, at which the Governors were able to give the Viceroy and each other the benefit of their individual experiences of food administration and to exchange views on questions of post-war reconstruction.

THE FAMINE IN BENGAL

THE most serious immediate problem with which Lord Wavell had to deal was the famine in Bengal. A full analysis of the complex causes of this disaster is not possible within the limits of a single article. Broadly, it is to be accounted for by the coincidence of a serious physical shortage of rice in Bengal with an inflationary monetary situation, straitened markets in other rice-consuming Provinces, and the breaking up of free trade in the eastern rice-growing region of India as a consequence of the measures taken by the

Governments of the surplus Provinces to protect their own people against the spread of the infection. The Government of Bengal were slow to appreciate the full extent of their shortage. The efforts of the Central Government to help them, first by arranging for deliveries by the Governments of neighbouring Provinces and, secondly, by restoring free trade in the eastern rice-growing region, were partially defeated by the lack of co-operation or obstruction of the Governments which were in a position to export rice. It is easy to criticize these Governments, but agricultural statistics in India are notoriously unreliable, and in the early part of the year the Governments of the surplus Provinces could not be certain how they themselves stood. So, although during the months of March, April and May Bengal received some help, it was midsummer before Lord Linlithgow's Government had food moving towards Bengal regularly and in substantial quantities. Here it should be remarked that Lord Linlithgow was seriously handicapped by having to depend on a railway system already strained to capacity by military movements and the demands of war industry. At the crucial moment the transport difficulties were aggravated by floods on the river Damodar, which broke the bund protecting the East Indian Railway near Burdwan. From the point of view of Bengal's food supplies this was a first-class disaster.

Nevertheless, by the beginning of September if not earlier, Lord Linlithgow's Government had poured so much grain into the Province that there was no further anxiety, at least for the Calcutta industrial area. By the middle of September the city had stocks for three weeks. That did not, however, meet the problem of the Mofussil, particularly East Bengal, from which there were loud cries of distress. Grain continued to pour into Calcutta, but, owing either to shortage of transport or to the inability of the Government of Bengal to make the best use of what transport they had—probably both—the grain percolated only slowly into the country-side. Sir Thomas Rutherford, who, owing to the illness which has proved fatal of Sir John Herbert, had become Acting Governor, took up this problem energetically, but late in October the deliveries from Calcutta to the country-side were still not more than 900 tons daily. At this stage Lord Wavell came to Calcutta and, having seen what was happening in the countryside, put army transport at the disposal of the Bengal Government. Deliveries were soon stepped up to 1,200 tons a day, and a little later to 2,000 tons. That was sufficient to meet all needs but, of course, it took time for the grain to filter down into the remotest villages. It may be added that a large proportion of the imported food necessarily consisted of grain other than rice—of which there is a shortage in the whole of India owing to the loss of Burma—and that the Bengalis neither knew how to prepare these other grains, nor did their stomachs take kindly to them when cooked.

PRICES OUT OF HAND

MEANWHILE the rice market in East Bengal had got out of hand altogether. Prices had begun to rise immediately after the harvest, which was a bad sign. Then people noticed that rice was not moving in normal quantities.

The news got abroad that the Government were having difficulty in obtaining as much grain from outside as they had hoped. Prices soared. The Government's efforts to impose control were ineffective. Consumers panicked, growers held out for still higher prices, and speculators soon decided that rice was a sure thing. By the early autumn the wholesale price of rice in East Bengal was at least Rs35 a maund as compared with the normal price of Rs3 or Rs4. At Dacca at one stage rice touched Rs120 retail, which means in fact that there was none on the market.

The population of Calcutta suffered, but it was protected in various ways from the full impact of famine prices. Employers supplied their labour with grain at concession rates, and for other consumers of the poorer classes there were government shops in which rice was sold at controlled prices. Admittedly there were not enough of these and they were not conspicuous for efficiency, but at least they went a long way towards preventing obvious distress. There were, however, scenes of appalling distress in Calcutta due to the influx from the country-side of more than 100,000 people, mainly women and children, in every stage of physical debilitation. So-called gruel kitchens were opened to feed them, but too many of them were already hospital cases. Either they had contracted bowel diseases from filling their stomachs with any sort of rubbish, or they were in that stage of famine exhaustion where the administration of ordinary food was more likely to kill than to revive them. Those taken to hospital in time survived, but hundreds died on the pavements.

This focused attention sharply on conditions in the Mofussil. There the position was that in large districts of East Bengal, in which there is normally a deficit in rice, famine conditions prevailed. The same was true of the Midnapore district in West Bengal, which normally has a surplus of rice, but which had been blasted the previous autumn by a cyclone. The rural areas in the immediate neighbourhood of Calcutta were also badly affected, owing, it appears, to the abnormally heavy drain of rice to the city under the pull of high prices. Here many an incautious peasant paid with his life for over-selling.

INCALCULABLE DISTRESS

INFORMATION from the remoter country-side in Bengal is at the best of times sparse; during the famine it broke down altogether. Where the army has been out with medical relief they have reconnoitred villages, but otherwise the extent and depth of the trouble is probably still not accurately known. What may be said is that, in the worst affected districts, about 10 per cent of the population, comprising landless labourers, the smaller cultivators and persons dependent on village charity—in general that class of the poor who do not grow enough food for themselves—went to the wall. Having sold up their tools, utensils, houses and land to buy rice, they were, when their means were exhausted, pinched out of the villages and had to take to the roads. This although the richer villagers might have a year's stock of grain in hand; the milk of human kindness runs thin in Bengal villages. Many destitutes were kept alive by the Government's free kitchens,

but there was a heavy death-roll, either as a direct result of starvation or from the epidemics of malaria, cholera and small-pox which accompanied the famine. Emergency medical units, military and civilian, for both clinical and preventive work, were put into the field; but they came too late, and in any event one cannot be certain that civilian Bengali sanitary officers and their assistants will, in fact, do their job.

Although millions of lives were probably saved by the Bengal Government's relief measures, it has to be stated that, whether in their handling of relief or in their efforts to control the crisis in the rice market, the Bengal Government and administration showed up in a rather unfavourable light. They work, of course, under peculiar difficulties. Civilian administrative officers are very thin on the ground in Bengal. Unlike the temporarily settled Provinces, Bengal has not got a small army of gazetted land revenue officers who could be turned on to the business of acquiring grain from the villages and administering food control throughout the country-side. Officials required for this kind of work must be trustworthy and have expert knowledge of the country-side; they are not easy to obtain out of the blue. Large emergency staffs had to be recruited for relief work; in too many cases they let the Government down. The public health services had been weakened by the absorption of many officers of the Indian Medical Service into the military forces. Finally, the spirit of factious opposition in political life did not yield to an emergency facing Muslim and Hindu alike, and the Muslim League Government, while their own actions were not invariably free from communal motives, found that practically anything they planned had to be put through in the face of Hindu criticism and obstruction. Still, the Viceroy, when he returned to Bengal in December, was evidently of the opinion that the Bengal Government, having regard to the assistance they had received from the Central Government in the way of supplies, personnel and transport, had not done as well as they might have done. His first speech in India was accordingly notable, among other things, for a warning to Bengal to see that its administration was adequate for the future.

"The solution of Bengal's food problem now lies in Bengal's hands", said the Viceroy. "The Central Government has provided a generous measure of assistance in undertaking to supply food for Calcutta during the next few months. But the Central Government cannot continue indefinitely to carry a Province to which nature has vouchsafed so generous a crop if, through administrative inefficiency, the Province fails to secure that it is properly procured and distributed."

THE PRESENT SITUATION

THE position at the moment may be briefly stated. Nature has come to the aid of Bengal with a winter crop estimated at 8,300,000 tons as against the previous year's 5,000,000. Probably the safest way of securing its proper distribution would have been for the Government to exercise a food grains monopoly. Bengal, however, has not the machinery for this. So it was decided that their policy should be based on an effort to restore confidence by removing as little rice as possible from the districts where it is grown,

and to enforce strictly measures against hoarding and speculation, and the regulation and control of prices. To help in making this policy a success the Central Government have agreed to take the responsibility for feeding greater Calcutta, which is Bengal's greatest deficiency area. So the total quantity that will have to be removed is the comparatively modest one required to feed industrial labour outside Calcutta and the five districts of the Province which do not grow enough for their own needs. The Central Government were of the opinion that the Bengal Government should limit their purchases of rice to what they require for industrial labour and for stocks, leaving the deficit districts to be fed from the surplus districts by the operations of private merchants working under licence. This system worked well in Madras. The Bengal Government urged some practical objections to this course based on the peculiarities of the situation in Bengal. The Central Government, accordingly, although with some misgivings, acquiesced in the proposal that the Bengal Government should extend their buying programme to include the requirements of the deficit districts.

At the time of writing things are going fairly well. The harvest was late, so that the flow of rice to the markets has not yet attained much momentum. Even so, prices are easing in most parts of the Province; the Government are working through four large firms which they have appointed as their buying agents on a commission basis, and these have been buying rice at prices well below their statutory maximum. What the quantity is they do not say, but it is understood to be as much as the available transport from both military and civilian sources can move. But they are not yet out of the wood. Prices in a few of the areas with a heavy surplus are, for one reason or another, not falling as quickly as might have been expected. In several of the deficit areas which were hard hit by last year's famine, price control is still ineffective. The question is whether the Government can buy and move enough grain to steady the markets and restore confidence in the deficit areas without sending up prices in the surplus areas. If they cannot do that within the next few weeks we may well find last year's distress repeating itself in spite of a bumper crop. It is in the Government's favour that their machinery of food administration in the country-side is more elaborate this year than it was last, and it may well be that the uncertainties of transport in the Province, which is a big base for military operations, will give the Government more trouble than the actual procurement of rice.

As already mentioned, the Viceroy made his first speech at Calcutta in December, the occasion being the annual meeting of the combined Chambers of Commerce. It was a frank and direct utterance, which disclosed the Viceroy as mainly concerned with the maintenance of India as a stable base for the counter-offensive against the Japanese, and as preoccupied with the economic rather than the political aspects of this problem. As a matter of course he had a good deal to say about food. The Government of India had a policy for India as a whole based on statutory price control backed by efficient administrative arrangements, urban rationing, and efficient procurement and distribution schemes. He was quite convinced that, given the unwilling co-operation of the Provinces and States, they could carry out this

policy to the great benefit of India. "I am prepared, if necessary," he said, "to take the most drastic action in support of our policy." India, which has suffered too much from provincialism in the past, was vastly encouraged by this assertion of central responsibility for food administration.

• THE VICEROY'S PROBLEM

THE question which occurred to many in the Viceroy's audience was how this responsibility was to be exercised. Parliament, envisaging an emergency such as that which has arisen, inserted in the Constitution certain safeguards against provincial recalcitrance or inefficiency. The Central Government may legislate on any subject which is a provincial responsibility, and may either execute the legislation in question through its own officers or direct the Provincial Government to do so. In practice, however, it does not seem feasible for the Central Government to draft into any Province a complete food administration. Food is a subject with which not one but several departments of any Provincial Government are concerned. The alternative is to direct the Provincial Government to carry out the food policy preferred by the Central Government. Where the Province in question is one under the direct rule of the Governor no serious difficulty is likely to arise—at least none that cannot in the last resort be remedied by changing the Governor. Where provincial autonomy is exercised by responsible Ministers, however, it is another story. Whatever the merits of the Ministry's policy, it is almost inevitable that it has been framed to some extent with regard to political considerations, and a directive from the Central Government to change it can hardly avoid giving rise to political reactions, which make neither for good administration inside the Province nor for willing co-operation between the Centre and the Province. So, leaving aside the question of efficiency, the Central Government would be in the position of being responsible for a policy, the execution of which would be in the hands of a reluctant or resentful provincial authority.

The Central Government have been brought up sharply against this problem in their recent dealings with Bengal. What conclusions they have reached, if any, are not known. Meanwhile Mr. Casey has arrived in Calcutta and taken office as Governor in succession to Sir Thomas Rutherford. We shall see in the course of time what he makes of the situation.

Having reviewed the Government's policy on food and other immediate economic problems, the Viceroy proceeded to put before his audience one or two ideas on economic reconstruction. In conclusion he had a few words of political consequence to say.

"If I have said nothing of the constitutional or political problems of India," he said, "it is not because they are not constantly in my mind; not because I have not the fullest sympathy with the aspirations of India towards self-government; not because I consider political progress impossible during the course of the war—any more than I believe that the end of the war will by itself provide an immediate solution of the deadlock—but because I do not believe that I can make their solution any easier by talking about them just at present.

"For the time I must concentrate on the job we have to do. The winning of

the war, the organization of the economic home front and the preparations for peace call for the use of all the resources India has in determination, energy and intelligence. I welcome co-operation from anyone and anybody who can assist me in these great problems on which the future of India depends.

"While I do not believe that political differences can be solved by administrative action, I believe that, if we can co-operate now in the achievement of the great administrative aims which should be common to all parties when the country is in peril, we shall do much to create conditions in which the solution of the political deadlock will be possible."

This, of course, was not what the Nationalists in India wanted to hear, but it is difficult to see how any Viceroy could usefully say more at the moment. There is no opening for constructive political action. Congress and their supporters remain faithful to Mr. Gandhi's demand that the British should withdraw before any internal settlement has been reached. Moderate Nationalists assure the Government that Mr. Gandhi would be found changing his views if he were released—an assurance, however, which is not very convincing in the light of their own reluctance to father any policy other than Mr. Gandhi's. The Muslims dare the British to withdraw without having given them Pakistan. The Hindu Mahasabha has declared that no sacrifice is too great to prevent Pakistan. While nobody is content with the situation as it is, nobody wants change except on his own terms.

MR RAJAGOPALACHARIAR'S ADVICE

AMONG leading politicians there is one voice in the wilderness, that of Mr. Rajagopalachariar, advising his countrymen to take advantage of the British assurances that the Cripps offer still stands. It is an offer, Mr. Rajagopalachariar urges in a recent pamphlet, which gives India all she can possibly want and, if the road to independence by the methods laid down in the Cripps offer seems toilsome, that is a difficulty inherent in the facts of the Indian situation. Independence, he writes, is not in India the demand of a united people which is prepared to sacrifice everything for it. It is a demand shared by various communities and sections, none of which is prepared to realize the same object at too great a cost to its own particular interests. No party in India, says Mr. Rajagopalachariar, can reasonably expect the British, as their contribution to a constitutional settlement, to subjugate one community in order to enable another to exercise Indian independence on its own particular terms.

India,

January 1944.

GREAT BRITAIN

MR. CHURCHILL'S RECOVERY

MR. CHURCHILL has often spellbound the House of Commons, but he has seldom surprised it so completely as he did by walking in on the day Parliament resumed after the Christmas recess, at a time when the whole country supposed he was still recuperating in Africa. His tumultuous ovation from every quarter left no doubt of the pre-eminent and unchallenged position which he holds in the public regard, as he nears the end of the fourth year of brilliant but never easy leadership.

A MINISTER OF RECONSTRUCTION

He had been out of the country for two months. Just before leaving, he had made one of his happiest political appointments. Not only did he implicitly rebut the charge that his Government was not really interested in planning for peace, but he chose a means of doing so which—and war stress makes this doubly important—seized and held the public imagination. He created the post of Minister of Reconstruction. He gave the Minister a seat in the small War Cabinet. And he selected the man whose previous administration has won nothing but praise and universal respect, especially from housewives—Lord Woolton, since 1940 our Minister of Food.

Interesting overseas appointments made at the same time were Mr. Ben Smith as Minister Resident in Washington for Supply (the first Labour M.P. to receive one of the war-time Ministerial positions abroad), and Mr. Duff Cooper as British Representative with the French Committee of Liberation in Algiers, holding the personal rank of Ambassador. Later, Mr. Casey gave up his post as Minister of State in the Middle East and his membership of the War Cabinet on being appointed Governor of Bengal. Lord Moyne, Deputy Minister of State, succeeded his former chief as Minister, but without a seat in the War Cabinet. Colonel Llewellyn returned from the Washington post to succeed Lord Woolton at the Ministry of Food, and Mr. Ernest Brown left the Ministry of Health after years of intensive departmental service to step down to the Chancellorship of the Duchy of Lancaster vacated by Mr. Duff Cooper. With unusual but in this case well-justified audacity it was decided to promote to the key position of Minister of Health a Conservative back-bencher with no previous experience of Government office, Mr. Henry Willink. Aged 49, and elected to Parliament as recently as 1940, he had made a considerable reputation at the Bar before the war, and subsequently won golden opinions as Regional Commissioner for the Homeless in the London area when London was a nightly target for bombers. Now he assumes responsibility for presenting to Parliament detailed plans for the national medical service, to which the Government has pledged itself as part of its policy on the Beveridge Report.

FOOD, WORK AND HOMES

IN his speech at the war-time version of what in days of peace was justly called the Lord Mayor's Banquet, the Prime Minister appended to his review of the war a new slogan for social policy.

"No airy visions (he said), no party doctrines, no party prejudices, no political appetites, no vested interests, must stand in the way of the simple duty of providing beforehand for Food, Work, and Homes."

Homes look like being the most uncertain of these three, in the years immediately following the end of hostilities. Someone in authority has given 4 million new houses in 10 years as the target at which we should aim. It will require a miracle of organization if housebuilding, which has been almost at a standstill since the outbreak of war, can be restarted quickly enough to attain anything approximating to that rate of output in the first two years of peace. Yet that is the very period when the demand will be keenest, with families becoming reunited, and many a girl married to a man in the forces wanting a home of her own for the first time. There is reason to think that Lord Woolton appreciates this and wants to put homes at the top of his list of priorities, and that he and Mr. Willink may form a happy and effective partnership to that end. Already arrangements are afoot, without any diversion of energies from the war, to utilize equipment that is no longer needed in making camps and aerodromes for levelling sites and laying foundations on which houses can rise quickly, once building labour and materials become available again. It will take the edge off every domestic problem that peace may bring, if the nation sees rapid action in progress to meet the housing shortage. Lofty talk of a New Order wins applause in the market-place, but to the average man and woman it is family life that matters most.

PROGRAMME FOR THE SESSION

THE King's Speech at the opening of the new Session foreshadowed a range of Government measures more extensive than any peace-time Parliament would normally attempt. Nevertheless it was sharply criticized from the Left, as lacking in body and in a sufficient sense of urgency. Mr. Butler's Education Bill was already marked out to be the principal legislative business of the winter and spring. Two other important post-war measures have been approved—to safeguard the future of the disabled, and to define the right of a service man to reinstatement in his civilian job. The latter extends to volunteers the rights statutorily secured to conscripts by the National Service Acts already, and interprets more clearly the obligation on their previous employers; but no one is under the illusion of supposing that a real and universal assurance can be given to demobilized men and women by any words in an Act of Parliament, unless Government policy and world conditions render a state of reasonably full employment possible.

The Disabled Persons Bill breaks fresh ground by imposing, for the first time in our history, a direct obligation on all but the smallest employers to

engage a fixed minimum proportion of disabled men. It met with no opposition except on one point. As originally drafted, it appeared to offer equal subsequent aid to a pilot wounded over Berlin and to a cat burglar who missed his footing. Determined back-bench criticism led Mr. Bevin to insert in the Bill a preference in favour of service men and women suffering from disabilities incurred in war. Although conceived on account of a war situation, the Bill should have lasting peace-time value in our social armoury against undeserved misfortunes.

Other parts of the King's Speech foreshadowed an overhaul of the franchise law after a Speaker's Conference had had time to report, and a whole spate of White Papers preparatory to possibly controversial legislation. In addition to the national medical service already mentioned, the Government let it be known that 1944 would bring official proposals on social insurance (arising out of the Beveridge Report), on a new scheme for workmen's compensation, on the treatment of urban areas in need of redevelopment on account of bombing or otherwise, and on the thorny difficulties connected with the use and misuse of land not yet developed. Between the extremists who secretly would like the Government to do next to nothing about all this, and the counter-extremists who most unfairly charge it with wanting to do nothing, there is the mass of sane opinion, in Parliament and out of it, which ranks nothing so important as the speediest possible measures to victory, but believes that victory may turn to ashes a second time if peace finds us wholly unprepared. Among all such, Lord Woolton's appointment is seen as the pledge that the Government is in real earnest and will be wisely advised.

COAL-MINING AGAIN

WHAT happens when early and dispassionate appraisal of a future need is lacking has become lamentably apparent in the coal-mining industry. As THE ROUND TABLE has unhappily had cause to remark more than once, this is the outstanding instance where the Government's economic planning in war-time, so brilliant over most of the field, has been culpably at fault ever since 1940. A man-power shortage in the industry could have been foreseen in the autumn of that year by anyone who took the trouble to study the figures. No sufficiently bold remedial action was taken. Ministers fell back into the old inter-war habit of hoping that the figures meant something less unpleasant than they obviously did. They have reaped the consequences. By December 1943 the shortage was threatening to become desperate. Ministers who had talked for years about the importance of the optimum use of man-power found themselves compelled to adopt a fantastic travesty of all they had been preaching. It was necessary to establish a ballot system and to choose by lot, out of all the young men becoming available for the services, a sufficient number to be compulsorily directed into coal-mining. The effect on the best type of boy, who for two years had been giving up all his leisure to the Sea Cadets or the Air Training Corps in order to fit himself for his country's service, needs no particular imagination or description. We have come through another winter with no actual hold-up in

war factories for want of fuel, though at the cost of rationing coal deliveries in the south of England to as little as 4 cwt. a month. Sporadic strikes continue in some mining districts, despite the raising of the minimum wage to £5 a week below ground and £4 10s. a week for surface workers. The miners are unsettled, and disinclined to listen to the thoroughly patriotic voices of all their own principal leaders. Living mainly in isolated districts, many of them are indifferent to and largely unaware of the blistering opinions held by the general public about strikes in war-time. We badly need another Lord Woolton as Minister of Fuel.

FARMERS DISTURBED

THE singular importance of maintaining confidence in the Minister in charge, and the ease with which troubles and suspicions can swell when people are strained and tired in the fifth year of war, were sharply illustrated by a needless storm which blew up in the farming world. It all arose out of a treasured pledge which the Government gave to the farmers in November 1940:

"The present system of fixed prices and an assured market will be maintained for the duration of hostilities and for at least one year thereafter. . . . Prices will be subject to adjustment to the extent of any substantial changes in the cost of production."

When towards the end of 1943 new farm prices were announced—and failed to raise farmers' gross incomes by the £15,000,000 that a recently instituted rise in the minimum farm wage to 65s. a week was estimated to cost—the storm broke. It was not the immediate money aspect so much as the apparent breaking of the pledge which punctured confidence. "We know we shall be let down again now, as we were after the last war", was the comment among farmers up and down the land.

Mr. Hudson has all the qualities of a first-rate war-time Minister of Agriculture—except a diplomatic tongue. Instead of pouring oil on these tossing waters, he churned them up. Then, when the time came for him to meet a restive and crowded House of Commons, it was plain that he had a complete answer. Prices had already been raised by an amount more than sufficient to cover that extra £15,000,000, and the farmers were asking for their cake twice. No doubt there had been a genuine misinterpretation of the last sentence of the pledge, which they took to refer to every new change in costs of production, not to the total net change over the whole period since the pledge was given. The storm subsided, not without giving fresh evidence of traditional shortsightedness among the farmers' leaders, and of the value to a Minister of taking infinite pains never to be misunderstood.

MR. BUTLER'S EDUCATION BILL

THE minefields which complicate the conduct of agricultural policy are serious enough, but they are as nothing to those which beset you at every turn if you set forth to reform education. Mr. Butler at the age of 41 has the political skill and tact of a veteran; otherwise he could never have piloted

his great Education Bill successfully so far. What may appear at a distance to be intuitive genius turns out, if one looks more closely, to be the fruit of sheer hard work, with the neglect of never a detail and of never a word that might still a doubt or smooth a way. One is led to wonder to how great an extent the troubles into which we ran between 1919 and 1939 were due to the fact that many Ministers in all parties were simply not good enough.

Religious controversies have wrecked more than one patient attempt at educational advance in times past. The principal plans in the Butler Bill for improving the quantity and the quality of the education offered at public expense to all boys and girls commanded a magnificently impressive unanimity of support in Parliament and in the country. A limited number of controversial points stood out; these, as well as the main (and far more important) agreed features of the Bill, were indicated in the last issue of *THE ROUND TABLE*.^{*} But it was evident from the outset that the Bill would be in no danger of coming to grief on any of them, save only on the religious issue. If Roman Catholics, backed by a section of Anglican opinion, adopted as intransigent an attitude in the House as their supporters were moved to do in the country, and demanded distinctive Church teaching accompanied by no distinctive financial contribution from those who wished that this special teaching should be given, it was evident that Nonconformist opposition would be aroused of a strength and nature that might render the compromise solution, as proposed in the Bill, incapable of surviving. But the interesting and hopeful feature which emerged from the second reading debate was the softening of the old asperities that divided the Free Churches from the Church of England and the Roman Catholics at the time of the last great Education Bill in 1902. It was as though all were ready to draw closer together to defend and strengthen religious education in face of the real enemy—popular materialism.

INVASION YEAR

ALL this account of British life and affairs in the winter of 1943-44 might prompt the question whether Britain remembered that there was a war on. No one on the spot could have any doubt. But the country had fully completed its adjustment to war—at any rate to any kind of war so far experienced. Stringencies which seemed hard when first enforced had become habitual. Rations were limited but stabilized, and no one went short. The call-up was virtually complete; the screw could be given no more than another half-turn here or there. Women were directed to work long hours and far from home, and domestic help was practically unobtainable. But none of all this was new, and all of it was bearable when 1944 was to be Invasion Year. There was a consciousness of enforced calm before great events. The nightly and daily hum of great formations of four-engined bombers overhead, bound for Germany, we felt to be the long prologue before the launching of a combined British and American military operation more immense and more fateful than the mind could picture. The bombers we could hear or see, and our hearts went out with their crews. The

^{*} Pp. 38-9.

thunder of the London barrage whenever enemy aircraft approached the capital taught us what our own men had to face.

THE NAME OF MOSLEY

It was upon this tense atmosphere that the name of Mosley burst. Mr. Herbert Morrison, Labour M.P. and Home Secretary, decided on strong medical advice that his duty was to release Sir Oswald Mosley, former leader of the British Union of Fascists, who had been detained on security grounds under Defence Regulation 18B without trial since the summer of 1940. The Communist party of Great Britain (which incidentally in 1940 was itself anti-war) naturally leapt to protest, to stir up opposition, and to organize demonstrations. Mr. Morrison successfully justified his action to Parliament, which supported him by 327 votes to 62, all of the three main parties showing a majority on his side in the division. Within the House of Commons there was enough political sense to see that the Home Secretary had no secret Fascist inclinations, and indeed that his opponents were themselves resting their anti-Fascist case on the Fascist argument that a man whose political opinions you think detestable may be kept shut up in prison without trial till he dies.

But this was one of those occasions where a debate and a vote in Parliament do not close the matter. Popular opinion was hotly anti-Morrison. Neither the facts about detention without trial, nor the stiff restrictions which were still imposed on Mosley after release from prison, penetrated at all into the public mind, which only saw in the man released the symbol of all that it hated. Had Mr. Churchill not been out of the country, people would have been less quick to express against the whole Government the ludicrous suspicion that it had a soft heart towards Fascist enemies. It is always an easier job to rock the boat when he is away; no one like him can compel attention to all he says. But if one looks past all the absurdities of the Mosley storm, one may feel thankful for its revelation of the passion of resistance aroused by the very name of Fascism. One may equally wonder who in the years ahead is to teach the great British people, steeped in the strong emotions of a bitter war, that unreasoning passion and responsible democracy go ill together.

Great Britain,
February 1944.

AUSTRALIA

THE PRIME MINISTER ON IMPERIAL RELATIONS

IT is a tightly disciplined party that Mr. Curtin leads, jealous of its power and insistent on respect for the working of its formidable machinery. The Prime Minister has grown up in it and sets discreet store by the preservation of its basic unity. A recognition of these potent facts and their bearing on current political life is essential to an understanding of Mr. Curtin's approach to the problems of government, to his handling of Australian relationships in the conduct of the war and the planning of the peace. He was confirmed in power last August by the votes of many who are not regular supporters of Labour. But it was the energetic organization of the Labour campaign in the electorates which helped to give the Government an unexpectedly great advantage over a divided Opposition, and Mr. Curtin, on grounds both of personal allegiance and political realism, is not one to charge far ahead of the ranks of his party without a reasonable expectation of support.

THE CANBERRA CONFERENCE

It is thus that, just before Christmas, the most important political discussions since the election were held not in the House of Representatives but behind the closed doors of the Labour Party's Inter-State Conference at Canberra. This had been transferred from Sydney at the Prime Minister's request only after strong opposition, which showed at the outset that the wish of the leader amounts by no means to a command. Once at Canberra, however, the delegates came under the influence of the Prime Minister's earnest reasoning. He has been quietly dexterous in keeping his team together and diverting Labour thought into channels of which it used to be suspicious. His success a year ago in inducing the party to consent to conscription for overseas service in the limited Pacific and Asiatic zones marked a noteworthy change in Labour policy. It raised Mr. Curtin in the estimation of many Australians and it strengthened his hand in advocating other modernizations in the party's platform. There is at the same time an often expressed criticism that such proposals should instead go first before Parliament; but the Labour machine has made itself almost an integral part of the system of government and no Labour Prime Minister could ignore it even if he would. And at Canberra Mr. Curtin had the satisfaction of obtaining unanimous support for his motion accepting the principle that Australia must collaborate with other nations in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, and affirming in effect an attachment to the British Commonwealth.

The Prime Minister's resolution declared "the evolution of the British Commonwealth has exemplified the manner in which autonomous nations can co-operate in matters of mutual interest". There is nothing fundamentally new in this recognition of the virtues of partnership in the British

Commonwealth, nor even much in the plan advanced by Mr. Curtin for closer Imperial collaboration. The significance of the Canberra resolution lies not so much in its formal text as in its source. It was anything but a routine performance. It was proposed by Labour leaders who have been steadily warming up to the British connection, and endorsed by the party which, from the split over conscription in the last war until Japan struck in December 1941, had been in the main intensely nationalistic, had leaned towards isolationism and been hypersensitive at any action or attitude implying that the leading strings of colonial days had not been cleanly cut. It was, no doubt, as a reassurance for doubting elements of the party that Mr. Curtin annexed the following paragraph to his resolution.

"Participation in further development of co-operation among the members of the British Commonwealth, the nations of the world at large, and the Pacific nations in particular should be subject to the sovereign control of the policy of Australia by her own people, Parliament and Government."

MR. CURTIN'S DEVELOPMENT

As for Mr. Curtin himself, his consciousness of Australia's international rôle has been moving as his own responsibility increased on broader, perhaps less idealistic lines. In 1937, when Leader of the Opposition, he advanced the argument that Australia could best serve humanity by setting an example of internal progress and enlightenment, and rejected the notion of its playing a policeman's part in the outside world. First the war, and then pressure of office have brought about a change of outlook. Within the restraints imposed by his party's policy, which would have strictly limited Australia's fighting commitments abroad, he gave general support to the Menzies Government in its prosecution of the war. This was more than once acknowledged by Mr. Menzies. Soon after his own fall from office he appeared on the same platform as the new Prime Minister at a war loan rally. "I have had many wounds from John Curtin", said Mr. Menzies in a mordant reference to his own faction-ridden party, "but none of them has been in the back." The first portfolio Mr. Curtin ever held was that of Prime Minister. Japan struck two months after he had taken over without a Labour majority in either House. He had, however, been a member of the War Council since its inception, and was therefore well informed both on the facts relevant to the international position and on the policy having regard to them which had been pursued by his predecessors in office. He had publicly approved of that policy. He now found himself primarily responsible for the government of the country unprepared for war near its own shores, with its best troops still in the Middle East, and in imminent danger of becoming what the German radio called the "orphan of the Pacific", gravely exposed to invasion, with a coastline far too long for effective defence by the small Australian forces then available and the first trickle of raw American troops. The country was bewildered by the reverses sustained by the British, Australian and Allied arms at the hands of the Japanese. The instinct of self-preservation is strong. The hour was

charged with fate. It was a time of disillusionment and urgency. The cares of office were heavy and the Prime Minister was new to calculating the impact abroad of pronouncements made at a period of cataclysm. What he said at that time in stressing Australia's dependence on the United States may have left Britons puzzled and hurt, for they too were bereaved and humiliated by the disasters in the Far East. All our cups were bitter then.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

No specific date or event can be set as marking the beginning of Mr. Curtin's new appreciation of the British Commonwealth and his throwing off of doctrinal inhibitions. He is studious, moderate, sensitive and austere of habit and usually restrained in expression. He leads a party which is always subject to strong pressure from below for the quick and full realization of all its objectives. But he has been raised in the brusque Australian school of political reality, and he is essentially a practical man. It would perhaps therefore be extravagant to speak of his "conversion". Still, his public utterances—and all Australian Prime Ministers make many such, and more outside Parliament than within—show that his attitude towards Britain and the British system in general has moved lately through benevolence to warm appreciation. This has been especially noticeable since the elections. Thus, while there are members of the Cabinet who may feel that their only loyalty is to Australia, Mr. Curtin himself is now devoted to a less exclusive philosophy. While he did not, because of the caucus system, choose his own Ministers, who were elected by the party, the influence he exercised on them and on the pertinacious elements in the rank and file has increased his own stature. Moreover, the perils of 1942 in the Pacific, the hard-won recovery of 1943 and at length the road to victory which is coming into sight with 1944 must have convinced the most confident of the former isolationists that Australia could not hope to secure peace with a return to the old aloofness inseparable from Labour's seeking after a hermetically sealed paradise in this island continent.

Mr. Curtin needed the greater elasticity he has now secured for the next development in partnerships and alliances which have, with this country's own sturdy fighting, permitted Australia to survive. It is obvious that Australia cannot allow peace to end the close relationship with the United States which the war has brought. But Britain's stock here has recovered from the slump of the Singapore days, and the wise and helpful words of Maj.-General Lethbridge, who leads the British military mission, have increased the confidence that substantial aid will be sent to this area as soon as European preoccupations permit. Political cordiality has grown with Britain's military vindication. This has enabled Mr. Curtin to win the Labour Party Conference to an endorsement, which might not easily have been secured before, of his intention of making what he called the "instinctive association" of Britain and the Dominions work more smoothly and more positively than before. The Prime Minister's mind is much absorbed with this hope. He seeks to create administrative machinery which will not weaken the sentimental warp and woof of the British Commonwealth, but

will give it a new and more coherent effect. He aims at making its voice in world affairs prompt and telling. There is much common feeling, but it has lacked unified expression. The independent and sometimes unpredictable operation of the separate controls has been proved dangerous to ourselves as well as surprising to our enemies.

THE COMING VISIT TO LONDON

THE way has now been cleared for Mr. Curtin's visit to London. In domestic affairs the moment seems propitious. The election in August gave him record Labour majorities in both House and Senate. Nothing has happened between the election and the end of 1943 to weaken the Government's internal position. The attenuated United Australia and Country parties, which in any event would not hinder the Government's war measures, have not recovered from their disaster at the polls, and have not yet evolved more positive and popular policies. The Labour Conference, although it had a tussle with the Prime Minister over some issues, gave him, expressly or by implication, the wider liberty of action required to adapt the party planks to changed world conditions. The journey which the Prime Minister had resolved not to undertake while the parliamentary position was insecure, and for which he was not eager until he had persuaded his party of the wisdom of his purposes, now becomes expedient. For the first time since the negative Imperial Conference of 1937 there appears to be the possibility of all the Prime Ministers of the Dominions conferring in London with the Prime Minister of Britain. Most Australians, noting how readily Field Marshal Smuts has been able to leave his Dominion with internal problems far more perplexing than those which confront this country, and reading of the visits to London of the Prime Ministers of Canada and New Zealand, had long thought it desirable that Mr. Curtin should make these personal contacts. He has twice been represented in Washington and London by the Attorney General, Dr. Evatt, who is also Minister of External Affairs. Dr. Evatt has had a prominent share in broadening the outlook of the party to fight whose cause he resigned from the High Court bench. His stand in the 1943 election for the principle that Labour must govern for the great middle groups, and not only for the trades union movement, contributed much to the party's success in the key State of New South Wales. Mr. Curtin has not, however, been abroad since 1924. He was the Australian delegate to the International Labour Office Conference, but had not then entered Parliament. He was not included in the Labour Ministry which foundered in the early years of the depression, and he lost his seat in the 1931 election. It will be largely by private consultations that he will develop in London in detail his plan for the tighter weaving of the affairs of the British Commonwealth.

A PLAN OF CLOSER UNION

THIS he broached at Adelaide on August 15 towards the close of the election campaign, in the course of which he had veered away from the opening of

contentious attacks on the war administration of his predecessors and had taken up loftier and more profitable ground. He was encouraged by the interest immediately aroused. The useful pamphlet published by *The Times*, incorporating its own and some of its readers' comments on the proposals, also revived the study of methods for reconciling the sovereignty of five scattered Governments with the need for parallel policies in foreign relations and defence. Imperial evolution, as Mr. Curtin sees it, is based on his statement that "the mother country could not manage the Empire on the basis of a Government sitting in London". Some of the principles he laid down governing the consultations on a common Imperial policy have already come into effect as a war-time measure. Looking to the future he gave the Labour delegates on December 14 his ideas for a permanent secretariat of the Imperial Conference.

"This", he said, "would normally be located in London, but it would be an ambulatory body and would function at the Conference place of meeting. All the Dominions would be represented in the secretariat. It would be responsible for the preparation and presentation of information on the subjects to be considered by the Conference from time to time. It would provide the Conference with an agency for the continuity of its detailed work, which is important in view of the changes which occur in Governments and Prime Ministers. The secretariat would not supersede the present established direct channels of communication between Governments, though its members would be directly responsible to their respective Prime Ministers."

Mr. Curtin is here seeking to form an organization on which no Imperial Conference has yet been able to agree. Canada and South Africa were especially sensitive to proposals for permanent bodies which, they feared, might exercise a limiting effect on their self-determination. But the lessons of the war must surely underline the need not only for more frequent meetings of leaders, but also for more intimate understanding among subordinates. Of no zone was this more true than of the Far East, where events proved the political liaison to be as faulty as the armed forces were inadequate. The physical problem has been entirely altered by air transport. Long absences of Ministers from their own capitals are no longer necessary. In peace-time, by the fastest available combination of sea and land travel, London lay at a distance of a month from Canberra. Now it is within a week of strenuous flying, and with the return of peace flying will be less strenuous and, no doubt, faster. Mr. Curtin has given several demonstrations of his attachment to the principle of continuity in Australia's external relations. He has extended the term of the High Commissioner in London, Mr. Bruce, a former political opponent, and has often publicly praised his work there. He had a tiff with Mr. Churchill over the loss of the services of Mr. Casey, likewise a former political opponent, from the Legation at Washington. Although leading a party which might have preferred that a Labour Government should be represented abroad by Labour supporters, he has by no means confined his selection for established and new diplomatic posts to political sympathizers.

LABOUR'S BROADENING OUTLOOK

HE has refrained, it will be observed, from touching on the vexed question of sovereignty, a basic issue in any reorganization of the British Commonwealth, to which the late Lord Lothian and Mr. Lionel Curtis have so frequently and so cogently directed attention. Nevertheless there has been widespread satisfaction at the sentiments expressed by Mr. Curtin, especially at all that is implied in the approval by the Labour Conference of his address describing the British Commonwealth "as an example and pattern for a world society of nations". He has set political Labour on a path broader than any it has been prepared to accept for many years. Mr. Menzies, the Leader of the Opposition, made a characteristically logical comment on the Prime Minister's conception of Imperial relationships. He dwelt on Mr. Curtin's advocacy of frequent meetings of Prime Ministers, recalling that, when he himself wished to return to London in August 1941, the Labour party refused its sanction, holding that the place of the Prime Minister of Australia in war-time was at home. It appeared, he added, that "the supposed new policy of the Labour Government is nothing more than the acceptance of the viewpoint on those Empire matters long held by the non-Labour parties". It comes, however, as a deep relief to many Australians that the Labour party is following a leader who is now prepared, while rejecting hobbles, to run in international harness.

THE DUKE OF GLOUCESTER

WHEN the Duke of Kent was killed in an air disaster, after the war had delayed indefinitely his taking up his 1939 appointment as Governor-General of Australia, it was not expected that another of the royal brothers might so soon be spared for the task. The tentatively published forecast of the selection of the Duke of Gloucester was therefore received with caution here until the former announcement that, on the advice of the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, he had been appointed. The Duke, who is already known to Australians from 1934 when he represented George V at the centenary celebrations in Victoria, and also visited other States, may count on a welcome as lavish as the circumstances of war permit. He has, however, asked the Prime Minister to avoid any unnecessary expense on his behalf, and said that he does not desire for the Duchess or himself any facilities in excess of those made available to his predecessors. The Duke succeeds Lord Gowrie, V.C., whose long tenancy of Yarralumla House, the vice-regal lodge in the outskirts of Canberra, has been marked by unostentatious service within the now limited sphere of a Governor-General, and by close counsel and cordial relations with all the Governments of his time. The death in action of Patrick Hore Ruthven, the talented only child of Lord and Lady Gowrie, has brought them the sympathy of the nation with which their lives have been bound up since they came here first in 1928 to Government House, Adelaide.

Australia,

January 1944.

SOUTH AFRICA

PRODUCTION OF WAR SUPPLIES

THE Director-General of Supplies has recently made public some interesting information on the extent of South Africa's production of war supplies. During three years of war, in spite of starting from scratch and having developed no extensive army production programmes before the collapse of France in 1940, South African industry has turned out an amazing quantity and variety of goods. These range from aircraft bombs to assegais; from bayonets through Bellman hangars, biscuits, blankets, boots and box-girder bridges to bread and butter; from cartridge cases to condensed milk, and so on through the alphabet to waterbottles, wireless sets and X-ray vans. They include, as an example of light repetition work, nearly 400 million rounds of small arms ammunition, or, as an example of heavy engineering, 232 complete pieces of ordnance. Items of clothing are for the most part to be reckoned in millions, including 7,500,000 pairs of boots and shoes, both leather and canvas.

Machine tools valued at more than £1,000,000 have been imported into South Africa since the outbreak of war to enable the great expansion of industrial production to take place. In addition, machinery which has proved remarkably effective has often been improvised locally. One example of the ingenuity that has been displayed is to be found in the wholesale transfer of heavy industrial equipment. In order to cope with the increased demand for 1,000-lb. bombs a complete steel-framed building with a floor space of nearly an acre was recently requisitioned in South-West Africa, dismantled and sent by rail 1,200 miles to Witwatersrand. It is now being re-erected round a smaller workshop, in which production is continuing without a break until the construction of the new shop is sufficiently advanced for the walls of the present one to be broken down in order to make use of the increased floor-space. The achievements of South Africa's engineering industry are all the more impressive in view of the comparative ill-success of the C.O.T.T. (Central Organization for Technical Training). This organization has certainly demonstrated how much more rapidly skill can be acquired under modern educational methods than under the time-honoured system of apprenticeship; and in the long run its successful educational work will probably be responsible for far-reaching modifications of apprenticeship conditions and requirements. But up to the present the demand for training has been unexpectedly small. This may be because no definite status in the post-war world has been guaranteed to workers trained under C.O.T.T. As a result, a disappointingly small proportion of the additional workers—close on 20,000 black and white—who have been employed in engineering since the beginning of the war has had the benefit of this specialized training.

One branch of industry which has made such progress as to deserve

special mention—with an expansion second only to that of engineering—is the food processing industry. In the fifth year of the war this is to be developed still further: the year's programme includes the canning of 125,000,000 lb. of jam, 40,000,000 lb. of fruit, 35,000,000 lb. of vegetables, 50,000,000 lb. of sausages, milk and fish. The main limiting factor is the supply of tinplate, but canning is already being supplemented by the output of four factories engaged in the dehydration of vegetables, while further dehydration plants are in course of erection. Plans are also on foot for the cultivation of food yeast on a large scale as a by-product of the Natal sugar refineries.

With the successful completion of the North African campaign, and with the armament production of the United States getting well into its stride, there have been changes in the types of war production most urgently required of South Africa. These have recently been fully discussed with a mission from the United Kingdom and representatives of the Eastern Group Supply Council, and the necessary revision of the South African programme has been accepted.

TRANSPORT—RAIL AND ROAD

In South Africa, with its widely scattered population, a smoothly functioning transport system is particularly important. The strains which the war has imposed are now becoming apparent. The railways carried nearly 2,000,000 tons more goods, and over 33,000,000 more passengers, in 1942-43 than in the previous year. The problem of maintaining sufficient rolling-stock in operation has become acute. "The mine workshops on the Witwatersrand are now helping with repairs, while 1,000 wagons are on order from a South African firm. There remains the problem of the replacement of worn-out lines and old locomotives. More than 150 new locomotives are now on order, but that is a different matter from securing their delivery. The railways can be congratulated on having coped successfully with a record traffic in difficult circumstances.

The railways, however, must be supplemented by other forms of transport, among which motor vehicles have taken first place during the past twenty years. Very few of the cars, buses or lorries on the roads are now less than five years old, there is a scarcity of rubber and spare parts, and it is estimated that new vehicles are unlikely to be forthcoming before 1947 at the earliest. The problem of conservation has therefore become urgent, and national regulation of public transport has been undertaken. A bus and trolleybus curfew has now been imposed, and no services are in operation after 10 p.m. The frequency of the service has also been drastically reduced, and the intervals between stops have been lengthened. Restrictions on the delivery services are becoming increasingly severe. A plan for the production of spare parts and for the establishment of special depots for stripping and reconditioning commercial vehicles is being prepared by the Controller of Motor Vehicles. In these ways it is hoped that—at the cost of considerable inconvenience—it will be possible to maintain all essential motor transport services in operation.

It is even harder to find a satisfactory solution for the difficulties of private transport. Many areas are not served by public services at all; very few could dispense with private transport facilities without throwing an intolerable burden on public undertakings. For these reasons petrol rationing in the Union is on a more lenient basis than in many other countries. A basic ration is allowed giving a monthly allowance of about 200 miles, and supplementary allowances are granted on a comparatively generous scale. It cannot be denied that a certain wastefulness results, and suggestions for the withdrawal of the basic ration are made from time to time. It is to be feared, however, that this might completely disrupt the already hard-pressed public services and, unless accompanied by the requisitioning and redistribution of cars, would itself involve a wasteful unemployment of motor vehicles.

LONG-TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

SOUTH AFRICA is not merely concerned with the urgent problems of the moment. As early as 1941 the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission, which had been appointed with a view mainly to investigating how far the Union could meet, out of its own resources, those requirements which could no longer be satisfied from abroad, issued, under the sub-title of "Fundamentals of Economic Policy in the Union", a third interim report on the long-term development of our national resources.

This report surveyed briefly the Union's physical and human resources, its occupational and social structure and its economic institutions. It found that many contradictory aims and policies held sway, with the inevitable result that sectional interests had misdirected the economy. "South Africa's fiscal, labour, transport and foreign trade policies", it said, "have in many respects been directed towards the development of the country's weaker industries." Tariff protection had partly defeated its own ends by contributing to "raise the industrial cost structure to a level which prevents the manufacturing industries from being self-supporting". Assistance to agriculture had been given in ill-considered forms, "often unfortunately with adverse effects on the Union's soil resources". As regards the utilization of labour resources, "the present artificial classification of skilled workers is not in the interests of the genuine skilled worker and places an unjustifiable burden on industry which seriously hampers its development". The un-economic carriage of low-rated goods by railways as a concession to the higher-cost producers "neutralizes the natural advantages of industries in favourably located regions if these are required to bear the loss on long-distance traffic, and the development of these industries will therefore be hampered". If a rational long-term economic policy is to be formulated and carried through, it thus becomes clear that the Union will have to set about the complicated, often invidious, and almost impossible task of unscrambling eggs which had been scrambled with lack of foresight in the past. To enable this to be undertaken the Commission recommended the appointment of a full-time economic advisory and planning council of judicial status to investigate and advise on the country's social and economic problems.

THE POST-WAR TRANSITION

THE full-time advisory body advocated by the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission was not brought into being, but in its place a part-time social and economic planning council was appointed under the chairmanship of Doctor H. J. van Eck (who was also Chairman of the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission). A permanent secretariat is gradually being formed.

Only one report has so far been published, though others, stated to be far-reaching in scope, have recently been submitted to the Cabinet. There is no point in discussing these on mere hearsay evidence. In any case they are unlikely to be as epoch-making as is sometimes imagined. A series of regional investigations of a number of important areas which are being undertaken under the Council's auspices has not yet been completed, while the Council regards these as an essential basis for planning re-employment schemes, road and housing construction, and other economic developments within the Union. In some ways, indeed, the Council's recognition of the necessity of gaining further knowledge before proceeding with any important schemes of development is one of the most encouraging aspects of its first report. It is evident that the Council is not taking its duties lightly, but is determined to base its recommendations on an earnest and impartial study of the issues involved. If it continues its deliberations in the same spirit and with the same determination it will be able to gain public confidence as an impartial and well-informed critic of pet utopias and, though it will undoubtedly make mistakes, it will in that way prove of great service to the community.

FUTURE OF THE NATIVE

ANOTHER encouraging feature of the Council's first report is that it coincides with a growing trend in official and in business opinion in South Africa, which recognizes the Natives as under-privileged fellow-citizens, and which insists that their welfare must be the main consideration in South Africa's plans for post-war development. This was also a notable theme in the third report of the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission.

Nevertheless post-war readjustments in the Union will not be easy. The re-employment of discharged soldiers will prove a difficult problem, and not only because of the numbers involved. Many will have become accustomed to new conditions of life and new standards of living. Others will find difficulty in returning to their old occupations, either because these are no longer available or because they have lost their old skill or their inclination for the work. On the other hand, not only has the expansion of the industrial war effort created a much enlarged labour force of trained or semi-trained artisans, but the army training in which every fighting man has been taught to use and to maintain much complicated equipment has created an immense reservoir of mechanical knowledge which previously did not exist. A successful transition to an expanding post-war economy will largely depend

on how far this can be utilized. South Africa has many advantages for successful industrial development. If these chances are lost—as they may well be—through reluctance to have its position as a paradise for a limited class of skilled white artisans disturbed, we may face an impoverished and unsettled future.

Readjustments in agriculture and in agricultural policy will also have to be made in far-reaching ways if the country is to develop a more flexible economy. This has been recognized both by the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission and by the Planning Council. A great deal here will depend on the policy adopted by the Union Department of Agriculture which, though a branch of the civil service, has nevertheless become, especially under its present head, an increasingly important factor in politics. For many years departmental policy has paid too much attention to sectional interests, and this tendency is unlikely to be completely abandoned. There are some signs, however, that a broader point of view is beginning to have more influence.

IMMIGRATION

A LIVELY controversy may soon arise about the part which should be played by immigration in post-war developments. The arguments in favour of mass immigration are plain. The sparseness and the small size of South Africa's population add to the costs of industrial and agricultural production and marketing. A much larger population would provide wider markets and lead to reduced costs. For such reasons it is argued that South Africa should try to direct if possible a very large stream of prospective immigration from post-war Europe towards her shores, and thus build up a diversified industrial structure able to compete in costs with the rest of the world, which would dispel for ever the bogey of what is to happen when the gold mines are worked out. Opposition to any such schemes is likely to come from at least three directions. In the first place we must not underestimate the fears of many Afrikaners that their distinctive culture would be finally swamped by mass immigration. They will gain support in their opposition to immigration from the at present well-entrenched white artisans who would fear attacks on their jobs and more an hour. They would also in all probability be joined by the leaders of native opinion who, however unjustifiably, would fear that the rise in the economic status of the Natives would be impeded since immigrants would fill the openings which otherwise might have been filled by Natives. In view of all this, whatever its ideal attraction, a large-scale immigration policy hardly appears practicable.

South Africa,
January 1944.

NEW ZEALAND

WAR ON TWO FRONTS

THE success of each Allied thrust in New Guinea and the Pacific islands has carried the scene of actual fighting farther back from the coasts of New Zealand, and in 1943 the fear of immediate attack has diminished. New Zealand cities could accordingly assume a more cheerful appearance at night. The number of home defence troops could be reduced in favour of essential industries. The Home Guard, which was born in the dark days following the fall of France and reached its peak in numbers and efficiency a year ago, could be transferred to the reserve. Yet, in spite of the decreasing sense of strain, recent months have also brought sharply into the foreground some problems which are vital both to our war effort and to the prosperity of New Zealand in the post-war world. Towards the end of 1943 New Zealand troops went into action in Italy, thus, it was remarked, raising again and "with fiery emphasis" the root problem of the use of our man-power. Since Japan entered the war New Zealand has fought on two fronts. As a country which is European by culture and economic interest, she was deeply involved in the struggle against Hitler. Yet her geographical position gave her primary responsibilities in the war against Japan. In 1942 therefore New Zealand braced herself to meet the threat of actual invasion, and in 1943, when that threat had been repulsed by hard fighting elsewhere, a New Zealand division took its place in the front line in the Solomons, at the same time as New Zealand troops were fighting in North Africa from Alamein to Tunis.

This partition of the N.Z.E.F. symbolized New Zealand's dualism as a European and a Pacific country; and the will to respond to all demands made by a constantly changing situation also symbolized, at least in some eyes, an attempt to achieve the impossible. In the first world war New Zealand strained her economy to maintain a single division abroad; in 1943 she had two divisions in widely separated parts of the world, together with an unknown, but certainly considerable, number of men in the Air Force and the Navy, in addition to a Territorial Force. As the immediate crisis caused by the Japanese attack faded into the background, the question inevitably arose as to whether New Zealand could maintain armed forces on such a scale, at least without serious injury to her utility as a supply base for Britain and the Allied forces in the Pacific. If economy in man-power were called for, an obvious suggestion was that New Zealand should abandon the attempt to keep a division in the front line in both hemispheres—a decision involving an awkward choice in view of her lifelong bonds with Europe through Britain, and her newly found consciousness of her status as a nation of the Pacific.

MAN-POWER AND PRODUCTION

In January 1944, however, both divisions were still in the field. This was a clear warning to the community that the pressure for fit men for the

forces would continue, possibly with rising intensity; and it caused some apprehension in view of the signs of danger already apparent in New Zealand's basic industries. In the first phase of the war production increased and goods accumulated because ships were lacking; but with Japan in the war New Zealand was cut off from her main sources of supply of artificial fertilizers on which much of her farming depends for its highest efficiency. At the same time the effects of the first years of war were taking an increasing toll of production. With machinery and equipment scarce and dear, and with the younger farmers and farm labourers being drawn increasingly into the army, the condition of the land inevitably fell away. Moreover the efforts of those who remained to adapt their farms led to a serious decline in some branches. To take the agricultural industry as a whole, production could be kept up temporarily by a sustained effort, but then the loss became cumulative. Unfavourable weather played an important part, the past season being the worst for twenty to thirty years. For all these reasons, though production has remained high and creditable compared with previous achievements, it sagged disappointingly at a time when the demands from Britain were rising through improvement in the shipping situation, and when the needs of the Allied forces in the Pacific still stood high.

The present problem is not to find ships but to maintain and, if possible, increase the supply of goods, and something at least has been done to meet the position. Strenuous efforts have been made to get fertilizers from alternative sources such as North Africa. As regards man-power New Zealand perforce stood to arms in 1942, but in 1943 large numbers of men were released from the army for essential industries, especially farming. When the seasonal work in the summer was at its height, men were temporarily drafted from the army or, in the case of non-mobilized Territorials, performed their military obligations by farm-labour. In general a high and increasing proportion of men and women work in occupations chosen for them, directly or indirectly, by an all-pervasive man-power organization. Perhaps more could and should have been done in all these directions. No one claims that perfect efficiency has yet been reached. The root of the matter may lie in general policy. According to Sir Walter Layton, the leader of the British Press Mission which visited New Zealand before Christmas, the figures show that New Zealand has mobilized for direct war purposes as high a proportion of her people as Britain herself. And he raised directly the basic question: can New Zealand continue to fight on two fronts and simultaneously supply the maximum quantity of food and raw materials which rank as most important among the sinews of war? New Zealand's fighting men could be replaced from other sources, he suggested, but not her foodstuffs. In his view apparently New Zealand might best serve the cause of the United Nations by reducing her military commitments and increasing her agricultural production. Others have thought the same; but any such modification of plans must be preceded by the fullest discussion with Australia, whose position is in many ways similar, and with Britain and the United States.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

At a time when it seems to be possible to combine planning for victory with planning of reconstruction, it is satisfactory that New Zealand's international links appear to be improving. Mr. Nash, our Minister in Washington, is back at his post and available for consultations in London. He is also Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister, and his visit to New Zealand in 1943 was unexpectedly extended by the closely fought general election, followed by the unfortunate illness of the Prime Minister. Mr. Fraser has now resumed his work, and it is understood that he will attend the projected Conference of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers. Moreover steps have been taken to strengthen our links with Australia. In 1943 High Commissioners were at last exchanged, and in January, during the writing of this article, a strong New Zealand delegation, headed by the Prime Minister, took part in an impressive inter-Dominion Conference, the result of which should be, not only greater mutual understanding, but also agreement on the policies to be urged in London and Washington. After all, New Zealand's economic problems are shared also by Australia, though with less urgency, as the Australian economy is now more broadly based. The general strategic problem is the same in both countries; the same chain of Pacific islands, if in friendly hands, screens both. If captured by an enemy, as in 1942, it threatens common ruin. As South Pacific countries, with long internal lines of communications and separated by great distances from friend and foe alike, both have a keen interest in the future of aviation; and, finally, their people are of the same stock, have shared the same crisis and felt in the same way, though not with equal intensity, the tug between European and Pacific responsibilities.

CONFERENCE WITH AUSTRALIA

THE Conference reached complete agreement on some issues of the first importance. Both Dominions are to advocate "the establishment of an international aviation authority to have post-war control of international air routes", all countries "to have the right to control the internal air services within their own territories". They agreed on the desirability of an early conference "on problems of security, post-war development and native welfare" among the Governments with territorial interests in the South-West and South Pacific area, including the United States, the Netherlands, France and Portugal; and the Australian Government was commissioned to take the necessary preliminary steps. The two Dominions reached a broad agreement also on their policy towards the Pacific islands, discussion on which was recently stimulated by Mr. Nash's suggestion for linking their administration in some kind of confederation. Both countries are to "act together on such matters as control of territories, native welfare and communications", and they are to "take the initiative in establishing an advisory regional organization in the southern Pacific to be known as the South Seas Regional Commission". Other members suggested for such a Commission are Britain, the United States and France, and its functions, which will

be further hammered out by specialists, cover in general the fields of material and social welfare among the native peoples, mission work, education, nutrition and research. Again, there was a thorough exchange of views on the problems of present and post-war strategy, and on the vital question of how the limited man-power of both Dominions could most effectively be used in the common cause. The discussion throughout was cordial, and steps were forecast by which unity of purpose might be maintained in the future. The High Commissioners are to be given still better facilities; a joint secretariat was promised, with mutual exchange of experts and frequent Ministerial Conferences alternately at Canberra and Wellington. A pledge was also exchanged that "both countries will acquaint each other with their views on matters of common interest before expressing them elsewhere, so that their views may be presented to the world with as much unity as possible". It appears therefore that we may expect a new era of close co-operation. The agreement is subject to ratification, and the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Holland, has made an emphatic plea that such important commitments should not be made without an opportunity for discussion in Parliament.

The two Prime Ministers both "stressed the spirit of inter-Dominion Empire, regional and international co-operation underlying the agreement", but it seems fair to guess that the Conference and the resulting agreements are the fruit of a growing national consciousness on the part of New Zealand, as well as of a mutual will to co-operate. Japan's forcible reminder that Australia and New Zealand are both situated in the Pacific struck the latter country only less convincingly than the former, and the lesson was emphasized by the welcome arrival of an American army. No doubt the effect of the shocks of 1941 and 1942 has to some extent faded, and New Zealand has not become as Pacific-conscious as once seemed possible. Yet the experience remains of active participation in the Pacific community of nations, in which American leadership has predominated over that of Britain. New Zealanders became accustomed to their forces fighting under United States command, and to the fact that their spokesman, Mr. Nash, had an acknowledged place in the formulation of policy in the Pacific area as a member of the Pacific War Council.

NEW LINES OF THOUGHT

THIS is the background of the new note in the New Zealand press which certainly does not usually reflect the more radical sections of New Zealand opinion. In it there is discernible a new interest in the affairs of the Pacific and of America. There is also a distinct tendency to emphasize New Zealand's status within the British Commonwealth. A newspaper, which six years ago was disturbed by the suspicion that at Geneva New Zealand was taking a stand independent of Britain, now refers incidentally and without a qualm to her "present status of independent sovereignty". The newspapers have been running a campaign for improved machinery in inter-Commonwealth and international consultation in which New Zealand should express her own views through her own representatives. That is

not to say that we have yet any clearly conceived policy to urge with regard either to war strategy or to reconstruction. Neither party when in power has encouraged Parliament to consider such matters. They are still rarely the subject of public discussion, and the traditional assumption remains strong in the community that leadership in the last resort rests with London, now linked with Washington. The continuing harmony of these two capitals of democracy is in fact the fundamental assumption of New Zealand's thinking about the future. It has underlain the few public statements made about such questions as the control of airfields and bases in the post-war Pacific, as, for instance, the Deputy Prime Minister's dignified comment on one of the periodical unofficial American predictions that the United States would wish to keep control, after the war was over, of bases in territory some of which is under the administration of New Zealand. No negotiations, said Mr. Nash, had yet taken place.

"But New Zealand would always be willing to discuss with Australia, the United States, the Netherlands and Britain the question of the mutual use of bases to provide economic transport and to maintain security. Obviously these matters will have to be discussed in connection with general peace and security arrangements."

Neither Government spokesmen nor the press have been concerned, however, to define the form of "general peace and security arrangements" for which New Zealand will press, beyond a broad and emphatic official endorsement of the Atlantic Charter and the hope that the seeds of a third world war will not be sown in the peacemaking after the present conflict. Much thought has been quietly given in New Zealand to such problems, including, for instance, the policy towards a defeated Japan and reconquered Malaya, and the obligations as well as the privileges implied for New Zealand in the Atlantic Charter; but so far much of the thinking of the individual and of the community as a whole has been content to bide its time and to carry on with the job in hand.

THE ECONOMIC SQUEEZE

NEW ZEALAND has indeed her own economic problems to face in the near future, as is increasingly apparent since the strain of the immediate danger has somewhat relaxed. Though secondary industry has expanded and can show a good record both in the quantities produced and in adaptability, nothing has happened to compare with the developments in other Dominions. As part of their war effort some countries have equipped themselves with whole new ranges of industry which, though perhaps bringing problems of their own, may stand them in good stead in the post-war world. By comparison New Zealand remains a primary producing country. Her prosperity and the extent to which she can help in world reconstruction will depend on the productivity of her farm lands and on the success of her marketing links with overseas countries. In the immediate post-war period, if the programme sketched at Hot Springs is fulfilled, there may for the time being be an almost unlimited demand for New Zealand's products, which makes

the best of all reasons for carrying the efficiency of the farming industries to the highest possible levels. But the question of price remains. For upwards of four years New Zealand has sold to Britain and lately to the United States at 1939 prices, or a little more. This policy is in line with the determination to prevent an unhealthy boom for a generation*. It is in line also with our domestic policy of stabilization, which aims at holding down purchasing power in the community and keeping a constant price level of a large group of essential goods and services. Nevertheless grave difficulties arise from the fact that New Zealand's imports have always been paid for at current price levels. When the original agreements were negotiated with the British Government at the beginning of the war, the suggestion was made by New Zealand that, if British export prices rose by a certain amount, say 10 per cent, then the prices paid for New Zealand butter, meat and wool should be raised accordingly; but the suggestion was shelved. Since then the prices of British exports to New Zealand have increased enormously. Sometimes goods ordered from Britain are, in the interests of the general war effort, supplied from the United States, and it often turns out that American prices are vastly higher than the British and, unlike British prices, show little sign of being stabilized.

At this point New Zealand's future is still partly hidden in the general obscurity surrounding the question of lend-lease and the probable future trends of American commercial policy. As a country enormously dependent on overseas trade, her prosperity must be greatly influenced by the nature of American economic policy in relation to the removal of barriers to international trade. For the present, however, this is speculative. What is certain is that the price levels of New Zealand's external trade are out of balance. The payment of interest on her public debt in London is fixed, and incidentally she is still paying promptly, as they come to charge, debts incurred for war equipment supplied by Britain to the New Zealand forces at home or abroad. At the same time her exports, expressed in terms of things she wants to buy and the British manufacturers wish to sell, have fallen seriously. For New Zealand this means a present shortage of goods—quotas are normally set according to values, not volume—and an added difficulty in maintaining the equipment necessary both for New Zealand's well-being and for the continued efficient production of the foodstuffs essential both for the present war effort and for reconstruction in the post-war years.

1944 IN PROSPECT

As Europe awaits the decisive hour of invasion, the indications are that New Zealand's main task in 1944 will lie in the less spectacular but equally vital fields of administration and economic planning. Only through successful efforts on the home front will the supply of goods to Britain and to the Allied forces be kept at the highest level. Local problems are inevitable.

* See also the discussion of the Land Sales Act, *THE ROUND TABLE*, No. 133, December 1943, p. 95.

There have been stoppages, for instance, in such vital industries as coal mining and meat freezing. Stabilization, again, was a bitter pill for those sections of the community who felt that an anomalous position was being stabilized to their disadvantage. As increased sacrifices are demanded from all, pressure for special concessions may be expected from all directions. As much will depend on the Government's political firmness as on the technical skill of the organization it has built up to administer the policy. Again much must depend on the most economical use of man-power alike in primary and secondary industries, and here again the price of success is eternal vigilance in administration as well as a clear-cut policy suitable to our changed strategic status. These are no easy tasks, but they can be handled in the relative security of a base behind the lines in little danger of actual attack and in the knowledge that, compared with our kinsmen overseas, the sacrifice asked of New Zealanders has so far been relatively light.

New Zealand,
January 1944.

CANADA

✓ THE FUTURE OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

TO-DAY, as people everywhere face the post-war world with mixed hope and anxiety, the future of the British Commonwealth as well as of the Empire becomes once more a most urgent question. Our legalists, economists and politicians can be counted on to take a leading part in the discussion; but history also has something to say which we shall overlook at our peril, and the first part of this article is therefore concerned with the historical approach to this subject.

FOUR WORLD WARS

WE are now engaged in the fourth war within two centuries which has involved the balance of power in Europe and the control of the Atlantic. Each of these wars has been in its own time a world war, and each of the first three was followed not only by far-reaching readjustments in the international scene but by fundamental changes in relations within the British Empire. The fourth will inevitably have similar effects, and numerous signs already point to such a result.

The first of these world conflicts, the Seven Years' War, was followed by the most disastrous chapter in the history of the Empire. Within fifteen years after the Peace of Paris in 1763 the Thirteen Colonies were in rebellion and England found herself facing an almost solid phalanx of hostile European States. It is unnecessary to trace the events leading to this unique and acutely dangerous crisis which brought about the loss of the Thirteen Colonies and embittered relations in the English-speaking world even to our own day. We need only observe that these events were marked by a complete failure in both England and America to reach constructive solutions of common problems. For this failure two groups were more than any others responsible: the extremists in England who would have imposed rigidities such as parliamentary taxation on the imperial relation, and the revolutionary radicals in the colonies who saw no value in that relation and set themselves to wipe it out. Between them these groups had nothing to offer except proposals which looked toward centralization on the one hand or a continuation on the other of the old conflict of jurisdictions and particularisms which even the colonists admitted had broken down in the face of crisis. These warring extremists thus made the disruption of the Empire inevitable, by destroying the middle ground on which constructive compromise might have been found.

Any solution would have been difficult, but no solution could have been more injurious than the war which actually came about.

"Do not entertain so weak an imagination," Burke pleaded in his speech on *Conciliation with America*, "as that your registers and your bonds, your affidavits

and your sufferances, your cockets and your clearances, are what form the great securities of your commerce. Do not dream that your letters of office and your instructions, and your suspending clauses, are the things that hold together the great contexture of the mysterious whole. These things do not make your government. Dead instruments, passive tools as they are, it is the spirit of the English communion that gives all their life and efficacy to them. . . . All this, I know well enough, will sound wild and chimerical to the profane herd of those vulgar and mechanical politicians who have no place among us; a sort of people who think that nothing exists but what is gross and material; and who therefore, far from being qualified to be directors of the great movement of empire, are not fit to turn a wheel in the machine."

In the events preceding the Revolution, there is no more significant figure than that of Franklin. For over twenty years he worked tirelessly for a reorganization of the Empire which would express its true genius of freedom and co-operation and make it unique in the world's history, only to find his efforts ground out at last between the extremes of opposing prejudices and arguments. The lesson of the 1760's for our day is nowhere more vividly illustrated.

The wars with Napoleon and the United States, which ended in 1815, brought no such immediate demand for imperial reorganization as had the Seven Years' War, but they created conditions out of which reorganization inevitably came. Three of these conditions were of particular importance: the ascendancy of the British Navy, the greatest single stabilizing element in the world order of the nineteenth century, which has been well named the *Pax Britannica*; the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine which asserted the right of the Americas to live their own life and was in effect underwritten by British sea power; and the Industrial Revolution which before 1850 brought free trade in England and the collapse of the old mercantilism. These and other conditions which were woven into the *Pax Britannica* encouraged national aspirations throughout the world and made the transformation of the Empire inevitable.

RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT

THIS transformation took a direction exactly opposite to the developments which brought the American Revolution, and it began with two events which, we can now see, clearly indicated its character: the Rebellions of 1837 in Upper and Lower Canada, and the Report of Lord Durham. The Rebellions of 1837, though they had many cross-currents and much justification, made one point clear: their failure proved that the majority of the Canadian people rejected revolutionary radicalism as a solution of their problems. Equally clear was Durham's rejection of the other extreme of reactionary imperialism. Durham defined in his great Report a middle ground of constructive reform which embodied nothing less than a new conception of Empire relations.

The conception itself was simple, nothing more than that the British principle of the executive's responsibility to the elected House should be admitted in colonial government, but it was revolutionary in its implications,

since it seemed to strike at unity of control in the Empire by placing the Colonial Governor under two masters, the British Government and the Colonial Legislature. Such an arrangement was pronounced impossible by constitutional authorities and indeed it was incapable of justification by any process of legalistic logic. But it was a response to the organic growth of the Empire which was breaking through outworn concepts of colonialism. Durham himself never attempted to work out fully its implications, but with intuitive political genius he did see that responsible government rightly used could be made not a disruptive, but, in Burke's great phrase—"a healing and cementing" principle in the Empire.

The success of responsible government in the years that followed was the work of far-seeing and determined men on both sides of the Atlantic. It did not come easily, for the new principle was a faith, not a rule of thumb. Robert Baldwin of Upper Canada, who had first urged the idea on Durham, Louis Lafontaine, Baldwin's loyal French-Canadian colleague, Joseph Howe of Nova Scotia, Lord Elgin, the greatest of Canadian Governors, and Lord Grey as Colonial Secretary, are high in the honour roll of those who staked their political reputations on it. From Canada and Nova Scotia it spread to other Provinces, then to Australia, New Zealand and distant parts of the Empire. These simple facts, known to every Canadian schoolboy, if seen in their true perspective, are among the most remarkable in modern history, for they record a transformation such as no other empire, ancient or modern, ever passed through.

The application of the principle of responsible government has been a continuing process, broadening out into ever more varied and complex relationships. Its story is not merely that of the growth of colonial autonomy. It has, rather, been one of the growth of new relations to replace the old ties of imperial domination and colonial subordination. Canadian Confederation in 1867 was one of its earliest and most remarkable manifestations. So accustomed are we to the historical fact of Confederation, and to later repetitions of it in Australia, and South Africa, that we overlook how astonishing an anomaly it was, for it was nothing less than a conscious attempt to build a nation within an empire. The framers of Confederation knew, however, perfectly well what they were doing, and they believed that it looked toward the strengthening, not the dissolution, of the Empire. "A different colonial system is being developed", said John A. Macdonald. "Instead of looking upon us as a merely dependent colony, England will have in us a friendly nation."

By 1914 the Empire had moved far in its unprecedented course, resisting equally tendencies toward dissolution on the one hand and centralization on the other. Then came four years of war, and again the pressure generated in a world conflict forced changes of far-reaching character. It is true that they were a continuation of the tendencies already so well established, but in their recognition of the principle of nationality and self-government they went far beyond any point previously contemplated. The result was that the Second Empire, as we have come to call it, was transformed into the Commonwealth.

This transformation had to wait for constitutional confirmation until after the war, but it was already substantially in effect by 1918. The Dominions, maturing rapidly under the burdens and responsibilities which they had assumed in the face of the common crisis, demanded that the inadequate machinery for consultation and even for the conveying of information from London to the Dominion capitals be improved.

"It can hardly be expected", wrote Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian Premier, to the British Government through the Canadian High Commissioner in London in 1916, "that we shall put 400,000 or 500,000 men in the field and willingly accept the position of having no more voice and receiving no more consideration than if we were toy automata. Any person cherishing such an expectation harbours an unfortunate and even dangerous delusion."

Like the beginnings of responsible government in the days of Durham, the steps taken to give effect to the new importance of the Dominions were the work of leaders both in Britain and overseas. In England credit goes in particular to Mr. Lloyd George, who insisted on cutting through the legalisms and inertia of those who declared change to be impracticable. Change went indeed to the length of setting up the Empire War Cabinet which was a powerful instrument in achieving victory although it represented a degree of centralization acceptable only as a war-time necessity.

1919 AND AFTER

THE development during the war years was carried forward and more clearly defined in the Peace Conference of 1919 and in the international settlement which emerged from it, and again the change, since accepted without full appreciation of its true significance, was a startling one. The Dominions demanded direct representation at the Peace Conference, while still remaining as "autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth". Such a proposal, as the Dominion Premiers well knew, flew directly in the face of constitutional legalism and the assumptions of international law with regard to national sovereignty. Nevertheless, it was urged at a meeting of the British Empire delegation in London on December 31, 1918. Borden, who acted as spokesman, supported his case by a recital of the services of Canadian troops in the field, and then*

"not as a threat but as a plain statement of fact, Sir Robert said that in view of conditions calling for their presence at home the Canadian Ministers would not attend the Conference if their duties were limited to sitting in an ante-room available for a call for consultation when needed. After Sir Robert had completed his statement, silence descended upon the delegation; but it was broken a moment later when Lloyd George said: 'When Canada makes a request like that, there is only one answer: it must be yes.' I do not vouch for the exact language, but I do for its purport, my information being beyond question. Thus in a moment a great stride in the evolution of the Commonwealth was taken. Sir Robert, by an understanding, had included the other Dominions in his advocacy of direct representation, and Lloyd George's statement, of course, applied equally to them."

* J. W. Dafoe, "Canada and the Peace Conference of 1919" (*Canadian Historical Review*, September, 1943, pp. 237-8).

This decision, with its implications, was carried into and through the Peace Conference. Both France and the United States, after first flatly opposing it, gave consent, and so there finally appeared among the signatories of the peace settlement and among the original members of the League of Nations a new kind of international entity—autonomous nations associated for common purposes under one Crown. The significance of this has been too much overlooked. The new conception of the Commonwealth was incapable of legalistic justification. Like Durham's "responsible government" it could be given substance only by the constructive efforts of those who saw its possibilities. It was not a piece of constitutional machinery: it was rather a political hypothesis looking toward the future for substantiation.

COMMONWEALTH AND INTERNATIONALISM

In the all too familiar story of the twenty years following 1919, one point only need be stressed: it is the inseparable connection between Commonwealth relations and international relations. The Commonwealth cannot in the long run be maintained without an effective internationalism: an effective internationalism cannot be achieved unless the Commonwealth contributes fully to it. This conclusion seems inescapable, and those who tend to ignore either part of it should ponder upon it. No one can maintain that the nations of the Commonwealth, either singly or together, lived up to its implications in the 1920's and 1930's. Certainly no thoughtful Canadian would now maintain that Canada did so. But for those who make criticisms of a certain type it should be pointed out that Canada and other members of the Commonwealth were not the only ones who showed reluctance to make commitments and take risks in the cause of peace. Particularisms and an emphasis on national rights, rather than responsibilities, sprang up around the globe among great Powers as well as small, and nothing now will be gained by recriminations as to our sins of omission and commission. We can all see the effects of the collapse of internationalism, and we are all now facing the baffling problem of harmonizing conflicting national interests all over the world with the necessity for an effective world order. Can the principles of the Pax Britannica—its emphasis on freedom of trade and intercourse, on self-government and national aspirations—be carried forward into the post-war period? This is the question that demands an answer, that transcends all others in the politics of the twentieth century, and that faces the British Commonwealth with special insistence.

What then, in the light of its history, is the British Commonwealth, and how may we expect the present world conflict to affect it? It is in essence an *entente cordiale*—a family relationship—of a peculiarly tough and distinctive quality. Resisting equally the extremes of centralization and dissolution, it has defied the judgments of those who prophesied its disintegration and of those who demanded a more rigid organization. It has confounded legalism, following the impulses of its own organic growth, and weathered during the present war, when it stood alone, the greatest crisis to which any association of nations was ever subjected in the history of the modern world. These

are the unequivocal answers to those who have asked whether it had meaning or a future. It is, however, not exclusive or repellent. It is not an end in itself, and the last thing to be desired for it is that it should be a *bloc* in a hostile world. It is indissolubly linked, as it always has been, with the need for a wider internationalism, and only by making itself a vital element in this wider internationalism can its true destiny be realized.*

But how can this be done? No more important question was ever forced on the British peoples, and there can be no easy answer to it. Both history and sound judgment point, however, to a guiding principle. The British Commonwealth is a community and its members must act as do the individual members of any real community—pursuing individual interests and disagreeing where necessary with mutual respect, but exploring common problems, co-operating in their solution, combating jealousy and suspicion, and keeping always alive and vital the community relationship. In this process the members of the Commonwealth will not only co-operate with each other but will according to circumstances make bilateral and multi-lateral arrangements with other nations, looking always toward the central aim of creating and strengthening a world community by throwing a network of co-operative activities around the globe. All this may sound too general to those who, to use Burke's word, have a "mechanical" approach to the problem; but is it in reality more general than any other fundamental principle of action, and is it beyond the wit of man to give practical expression to it? The method of functional organization already used in establishing Unrra, for instance, is capable of the widest variation and application. We must apply such methods in many different fields. There will be wide agreement as to the necessity of co-operative action in defence. They will require an infinite amount of patience, determination and understanding. But the goal is clear—the establishment at the earliest moment of effective co-operative action within the Commonwealth, looking toward the creation of an effective world order based on the principle of international collaboration. Can we, working with each other and with other nations, great and small, achieve it? This is the unavoidable problem of the post-war period. This is the wheel on which the Commonwealth will be moulded or broken by the fourth world war. No greater challenge ever presented itself to the political genius of the British peoples.

CANADA'S MIDDLE COURSE

FINALLY, what does this conception of the Commonwealth mean in terms of Canadian policy? It means, fundamentally, that Canada stands equally opposed both to the centralization and the dissolution of the Commonwealth. This middle ground is her historic position and she has clung to it with the utmost persistence. Underneath the confusion of public discussion, underneath the lamentable failure of Canadians to define their position clearly even to themselves, there has been only one policy of external relations and it has been followed with variations according to time and circumstance by every Canadian Government. It has been based on an intuitive understanding of the fundamental fact in Canadian history that Canada has

been the product of the balance between North-South and East-West pulls. Her policy has been determined by this inescapable fact. Let no one be deceived in this matter. Canada will not cease to be both a North American and a British Commonwealth nation. This fact and the rôle in Anglo-American relations which it marks out for Canada has been too little understood in either Britain or the United States, though it has been of the greatest consequence to both, and never more so than during the present war.

To these basic considerations the war has added others. It has not only emphasized Canada's intimate connections with both the United States and Britain; it has made clear her strategic place on the world's air-routes and her probable significance in the future relations of Western Europe, America, Russia and the Orient. Canada is emerging from the war as a leader among the world's smaller nations and with a growing realization of her potential influence. As one of the world's greatest exporting countries, Canada has a direct stake in the creation and maintenance of a world order which will encourage trade and a rising standard of living throughout the world. Her people have not thought through the baffling problems which are posed by these developments, but there is a growing disposition to recognize that Canada cannot expect to have the kind of world order which is necessary to her future prosperity and security unless with other nations she is willing to use her influence and assume her responsibilities in working for it.

If the Commonwealth becomes a powerful instrument in aiding the establishment of a truly international system, we need have no fear of its future. It is the genuine conviction of many Canadians that it can become such an instrument in spite of the appalling difficulties which confront us and that in so doing it will realize its highest destiny. The Commonwealth faces in its internal development only two dangers and they are the same two that have emerged at every crisis in its history. The first is the danger of attempting to impose a strait jacket of centralizing tendencies on it, and the second is the opposite extreme of refusing to recognize and use its possibilities. The conflict of these extremes ruined the first Empire a century and three-quarters ago. It is the one thing which can ruin the Commonwealth in our own day. A solemn responsibility rests on us not to ignore the unbroken testimony of two hundred years.

Canada's policy has too often in the past been hesitant, ill-defined and lacking in direction, though she has been by no means the only sinner in this respect. Too often we have discussed the Commonwealth solely in terms of sentiment and with no effort to explain its true nature and importance, thus creating unnatural and destructive divisions of opinion. To-day the war not only forces us again to examine our relations but presents us with an opportunity which will not recur.

Canada,

January, 1944



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